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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, the class action certification hearing has become 
the latest forum for disputes over the reliability of expert testimony.1 
                                                                                                                      
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Florida State University College of Law; B.A., Vander-
bilt University, 2000. I would like to thank Thomas Burch for his laughter and constant 
encouragement and my family for their faithful support and loving wisdom. Special thanks 
to Professor Greg Mitchell, who makes complex litigation comprehensible, and to Matt 
Simmonds and the Law Review for their exemplary work throughout the laborious editing 
process. All errors are my own. 
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Since these hearings may involve complex technical matters, liti-
gants frequently try to introduce expert testimony to either establish 
or challenge the basic requirements for class certification.2 Yet most 
courts do not conduct a Daubert analysis before admitting expert tes-
timony during certification,3 evaluate the evidence according to a 
uniform standard, or adequately weigh opposing expert opinions.4  
 Even though the Federal Rules of Evidence codify procedures de-
signed to ensure the reliability of expert testimony,5 courts have been 
reluctant to employ those procedures during class certification.6 This 
hesitation arises primarily from a fear of moving into the substantive 
merits of the case.7 Certifying a class based on unreliable expert tes-
timony may force courts to decertify the class later in the process, en-
courage frivolous suits that strong-arm risk-averse defendants into 
settlement,8 waste judicial resources, and undermine the legitimate 
purposes of the class action mechanism. Ideally, to make a fair and 
informed decision on certification, judges should use the wide lati-
tude afforded by the current gray area between the Eisen v. Carlisle 
& Jacquelin9 prohibition on an inquiry into the case’s merits and the 
General Telephone Co. v. Falcon10 rigorous analysis requirement to: 
(1) routinely apply Daubert as a precursor to admitting expert evi-
dence; (2) adequately weigh opposing expert opinions and other evi-
dence; and (3) employ a preponderance of the evidence standard to 
determine the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s proof.  The court could 
then resolve ambiguities in favor of the plaintiffs and err on the side 
of certification.11 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See Cari K. Dawson, Combating Class Certification Experts: Potential Strategies 
for Defendants, 72 U.S.L.W. 2051, 2051 (Aug. 5, 2003); Alice A. Kelly & Joy L. Holley, Us-
ing Daubert to Oppose Class Action Certification, 4 ANDREWS DIET DRUGS LITIG. REP. 6, 6 
(2001). 
 2. See Kelly & Holley, supra note 1, at 6.  
 3. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 4. Courts have an independent obligation to conduct their own inquiry into whether 
the plaintiff met the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Val-
ley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003); Martinez-
Mendoza v. Champion Int’l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1216 n.37 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659 F.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 5. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703. 
 6. See infra Part IV.B. 
 7. See id.; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin prohibits courts from evaluating the sub-
stantive merits of a case during class certification. 417 U.S. 155, 178 (1974). 
 8. See infra Part VI.A. 
 9. 417 U.S. at 178. Part II.A. further explains the merit inquiry. 
 10. 457 U.S. 146, 161 (1982). The Supreme Court’s requirement that courts conduct a 
rigorous analysis to determine whether evidence satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is further discussed infra Part II.A. 
 11. The burden of proof during class certification has not been adequately addressed 
in case law. However, since the typical burden of proof in civil cases is a “preponderance of 
the evidence,” courts should require plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
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 This Comment takes a closer look at the judicial handling of ex-
perts in federal class certification hearings, the amount of proof re-
quired for certification, and the means courts employ to evaluate the 
sufficiency of evidence. This Comment ultimately argues that courts 
should admit expert affidavits and reports only if they survive an ini-
tial Daubert analysis.12 Part II begins by briefly outlining the prereq-
uisites for certifying a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and analyzes the variations in Supreme Court deci-
sions that have led to confusion during certification. Part II also dis-
cusses the ambiguous threshold of proof courts use to weigh the suf-
ficiency of the evidence offered to satisfy Rule 23. Part III then ex-
plains the Daubert analysis and remarks on the ways in which par-
ties rely on experts to prove or disprove the Rule 23 certification re-
quirements. Part IV examines the misinterpretation of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 1101 as a possible root cause for the failure of courts to 
apply the Federal Rules of Evidence during certification. It also dis-
cusses how the judiciary has responded to Daubert challenges and 
how seriously courts examine expert evidence once it is admitted.  
 Part V of this Comment focuses on ways to institute a principled 
approach to expert evidence in class certification. Courts admit ex-
pert evidence via affidavits in both summary judgment and class cer-
tification hearings. In summary judgment hearings, courts employ 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part V.A suggests that the application 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the summary judgment process 
provides a viable starting point for discussion on the implementation 
of evidentiary rules in class certification proceedings. Part V.B then 
                                                                                                                      
that they have met the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See infra Part II.B.  
 12. Courts should use Daubert when evaluating whether the class meets the certifica-
tion requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; however, different 
concerns arise in class settlement. Under the amendments to Rule 23(e), which entered 
into effect on December 1, 2003, courts are required to approve “any settlement, voluntary 
dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class.” FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(e) (as amended). Consequently, if the court employs a Daubert analysis prior to certi-
fication, then it will be a non-issue in settlement proceedings.  
 For information about the courts’ role in class action settlements prior to the amend-
ments, see BERNARD J. BONN III & ANDREW J. HATCHEY, CONTRIBUTION, INDEMNITY AND 
SETTLEMENT ISSUES IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION (1993); Fred Misko, Jr. & 
Frank E. Goodrich, Managing Complex Litigation: Class Actions and Mass Torts, 48 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1001, 1046-54 (1996); Vince Morabito, Judicial Supervision of Individual 
Settlements with Class Members in Australia, Canada, and the United States, 38 TEX. 
INT’L. L.J. 663, 717-23 (2003); Mollie A. Murphy, The Intersystem Class Settlement: Of 
Comity, Consent, and Collusion, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 413, 436 (1999); Joseph F. Rice & 
Nancy Worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims: Comparison of Settlement Class Ac-
tion to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV. 405, 418 (1999); Tower 
C. Snow, Jr. et al., Defending Securities Class Actions, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY; 
SECUTITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES 177, 248 (May 8-9, 2003); Mark C. 
Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155 (1998).  
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elaborates on a potential framework and a rationale for the use of 
Daubert in class certification, taking into account the summary 
judgment process, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.  
 Part VI addresses two important changes in the landscape of class 
action certification: the use of certification to blackmail defendants 
into settlement, and the possibility that Congress will pass a “class 
action fairness act.” Part VI.A explains how courts could use Daubert 
to fulfill their duty to independently evaluate the evidence and to 
minimize the potential for coercion in the event of weak class certifi-
cation claims. Part VI.B anticipates the possibility that Congress 
may pass a class action fairness act, and proposes that federal courts 
could lessen the potential additional burden on the judiciary if they 
weighed the evidence offered for certification and utilized Daubert 
before admitting expert testimony.  
 Finally, Part VII outlines the broad discretion given to the district 
courts through both Rule 23(d) and the abuse of discretion standard 
of review. Part VII argues that courts should use their discretion to 
conduct a Daubert analysis and to sufficiently weigh the proof offered 
for Rule 23 before ruling on certification. 
II.   CLASS CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23 
 To understand how and why Daubert should apply during class 
certification, it is helpful to first review both the functions and the 
certification requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.13 Class actions serve two primary functions: (1) promoting 
judicial economy through the efficient resolution of multiple claims in 
one case, and (2) providing an opportunity for persons with small 
claims to assert their rights.14 Since the decision to certify a class lies 
within the trial court’s “considered discretion,” the trial judge should 
be ever mindful of these two functions.15  
                                                                                                                      
 13. The amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which became effective on 
December 1, 2003, do not affect this Comment’s analysis. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (see material 
appended to Rule 23 for amendment); see also supra note 12. The amendments relate to 
Rule 23(c), (e), (g), and (h) which govern the appointment of class counsel, settlement, no-
tice requirements, and attorneys’ fees.  
 14. See O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 15. Doninger v. Pac. N.W. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting 
Price v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 501 F.2d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1974)); O’Connor, 184 F.R.D. at 
318 (“In certifying a class, the court should keep in mind the dual purposes of Rule 23: (1) 
to promote judicial economy through the efficient resolution of multiple claims in a single 
action; and (2) to provide persons with smaller claims, who would otherwise be economi-
cally precluded from doing so, the opportunity to assert their rights.”); 7A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1754, at 49 n.1 (2d ed. 1986). 
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A. Terms and Conditions of Rule 23 
 Before the court considers the requirements of Rule 23, it should 
determine the existence of an “identifiable class.”16 This means that 
the plaintiffs should provide the court with a precise description of 
who is included in the class and who would be bound by the class 
judgment.17 This common law requirement allows the court to deter-
mine the suitability of a case for certification and ensures that those 
allegedly harmed by the defendant will actually receive any relief 
granted.18 After adequately defining the class, the party seeking class 
certification bears the burden of proving that the putative class ac-
tion satisfies the four requirements of Rule 23(a):19 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is imprac-
ticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact in common to the 
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.20 
                                                                                                                      
 16. Jerold S. Solovy et al., Class Action Controversies, in 2 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN 
FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 7, 44 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 
431, 1992), available at WL 431 PLI/Lit 7; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation: 
Certification Burdens, NAT’L L.J., July 3, 2000, at A14.  
 17. Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 44; see also Mullenix, supra note 16, at A14. This 
requirement is tied to former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(3) (this changed when 
the amendments to Rule 23 went into effect on December 1, 2003). See Solovy et al., supra 
note 16, at 39.  Certification of overly broad or vague classes is improper. Id.; see also 
David Crump, What Really Happens During Class Certification? A Primer for the First-
Time Defense Attorney, 10 REV. LITIG. 1, 12 (1990). The definition of the class cannot be 
vague or difficult to apply and should instead use objective terms “capable of present ascer-
tainment.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 30.14 (1985). 
 18. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 670 (7th Cir. 1981); Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 37. 
If a court certifies a class that is “too narrowly defined,” it cannot adjudicate and vindicate 
the rights of those who were injured. Id. at 45. 
 19. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(“The burden of proof to establish the propriety of class certification rests with the advo-
cate of the class.”); Heaven v. Trust Co. Bank, 118 F.3d 735, 737 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating 
that the burden of satisfying the requirements of Rule 23 is on the plaintiff); Horton v. 
Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 486 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proof that the class prerequisites have been satisfied); Jones v. Dia-
mond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1099 (5th Cir. 1975).  
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). The 1966 revision of this rule adopted a pragmatic approach 
to class treatment and listed four functional reasons for the class action: (1) preventing se-
rious litigation-related unfairness for both defendants and class members, (2) ensuring 
remedial efficacy, (3) promoting law enforcement, and (4) facilitating litigation efficiency. 
Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 1251, 1259-60 (2002). Adequacy of class representation has also developed into a heav-
ily litigated area. The analysis determining whether class representation is adequate asks, 
first, “whether any substantial conflicts of interest exist between the representatives and 
the class,” and second, “whether the representatives will adequately prosecute the action.” 
In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 447, 460-61 (N.D. Ala. 2003). To defeat a 
party’s claim to class certification, the conflict must be “fundamental” and targeted at the 
specific issues in controversy. Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1189; WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
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 After meeting the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the putative class 
must qualify under one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).21 
Plaintiffs may opt to use Rule 23(b)(1) where a multitude of individ-
ual plaintiffs might create inconsistent standards or impair the in-
terests of nonparties.22 A court may certify a class action under Rule 
23(b)(2) if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds generally applicable to the class,” which makes injunctive or 
declaratory relief applicable to the entire class.23 Plaintiffs should not 
employ a Rule 23(b)(2) action if they seek monetary damages since 
the drafters envisioned this section as a suitable means for adjudicat-
ing civil rights, consumer rights, and patent rights.24 Rule 23(b)(3) 
applies when questions of law or fact common to the entire class pre-
dominate over questions affecting individual class members and class 
resolution provides the superior method for adjudication.25  
 To determine the superiority of a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), 
the court must make specific findings to determine:  
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling 
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and 
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum; [and] (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered 
in the management of a class action.26 
                                                                                                                      
note 15, § 1768, at 326-27. When some party members’ claims have been harmed by the 
same conduct that benefited other members of the class, a fundamental conflict exists. Val-
ley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1189. 
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). A court may also certify a class as a “hybrid action” under 
Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). See, e.g., Midwestern Mach. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562, 
570 (D. Minn. 2001). Where there is a hybrid class, the court first resolves issues of liabil-
ity under 23(b)(2), and then the damages issue using the “opt-out” procedures of Rule 
23(b)(3). See id.; see also Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., No. 95-1162-CIV-T-25(E), 1996 
WL 407850, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996). Ordinarily, judges have broad discretion in 
determining whether the requirements of Rule 23(a) and one of the requirements of Rule 
23(b) have been met. See Williams v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 1973); 
Southern v. Bd. of Transp. for Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 318 F. Supp. 355, 359-60 (N.D. Tex. 
1970). If a class that is not certifiable under the rule can be redefined to meet the prerequi-
sites, then the court does not have to dismiss it. See Geraghty v. United States Parole 
Comm’n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1983); see also DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 
734 (5th Cir. 1970); Shivelhood v. Davis, 336 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (D. Vt. 1971). 
 22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). 
 23. Id. at (b)(2). 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note; Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 38. 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Dwight J. Davis & Karen R. Kowalski, Use and Misuse of 
Expert Opinions at the Class Certification Stage, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 285, 286 (2002); Solovy 
et al., supra note 16, at 39. 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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The plaintiff must also choose a member of the class as the class rep-
resentative.27 For purposes of certification, the court asks whether 
the plaintiffs provided sufficient proof to satisfy the prerequisites of 
Rule 23, not whether the stated cause of action will prevail on the 
merits.28 
 Although the certification requirements appear straightforward, 
several Supreme Court decisions provide judges with somewhat in-
consistent guidelines for conducting the certification analysis. In 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the Court prohibited judges from con-
ducting a “preliminary inquiry into the merits of a proposed class ac-
tion” at the certification stage.29 The Court reasoned that Rule 23 did 
not authorize an inquiry into the merits,30 and worried that a merits 
determination would “color the subsequent proceedings and place an 
unfair burden on the defendant” without trial safeguards.31  An in-
quiry into the merits would give plaintiffs the benefits of a class ac-
tion prior to certification.  
 Yet, in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, the Court observed that an 
‘“[e]valuation of many of the questions entering into [the] determina-
tion of class action questions is intimately involved with the merits of 
the claims.’”32 Finally, without ever directly questioning its previous 
decisions, the Court, in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, stated that 
district courts may certify class actions only if they are satisfied after 
a “rigorous analysis” that the case meets each of the prerequisites of 
Rule 23(a).33 Since this decision, courts have struggled to conduct 
Falcon’s “rigorous analysis” while avoiding Eisen’s prohibition of a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits.34  
                                                                                                                      
 27. This requirement is generally known as the “standing” or “adequacy” require-
ment. Mullenix, supra note 16, at A14. A named plaintiff cannot assert claims on behalf of 
a putative class when he or she was not personally injured. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat’l 
Bank, 723 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984).  
 28. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 154, 178 (1974) (prohibiting a prelimi-
nary inquiry into the merits of the case). 
 29. Id. at 178. Other courts have argued that a court cannot make a Rule 23 determi-
nation “without at least a preliminary exploration of the merits.” Sanders v. Robinson 
Humphrey/Am. Express, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (citing ARTHUR 
MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 15 (2d 
ed. 1977)). 
 30. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178. 
 31. Id. at 178-79 (stating that part of the plaintiffs’ burden is paying for the costs of 
the litigation). 
 32. 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12 (1978) (quoting 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911, at 485 n.45 (1976)). 
 33. 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). 
 34. Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1268. Some commentators advocate conducting 
class certification on the merits of the claim. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class Certifica-
tion Based on Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
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B.   Proving the Rule 23 Requirements: How Much Proof Constitutes 
Sufficient Evidence? 
 This struggle between conducting a rigorous analysis and avoid-
ing the merits inquiry is caused, in part, by a lack of guidance on the 
quantum of proof needed to satisfy the Rule 23 requirements. When 
litigants offer expert affidavits or statistics to prove the requisites of 
Rule 23, the court must make two distinct determinations. First, the 
court must decide whether to admit the expert evidence. Although 
courts have traditionally employed a low threshold for admissibility 
during class certification, they should use a higher standard to filter 
unreliable evidence.35  
 Second, the court must determine how much weight to give to that 
expert evidence as it decides whether the totality of the plaintiffs’ 
evidence provides sufficient proof of the Rule 23 requirements. Rule 
23 is silent on the standard of proof;36 however, the typical burden of 
proof in a civil suit is a “preponderance of the evidence.”37 Most court 
opinions simply ask whether the plaintiffs’ evidence, expert or oth-
erwise, sufficiently demonstrates the requirements of Rule 23.38  Cer-
tification opinions provide surprisingly little elaboration or guidance 
on what constitutes “sufficient” evidence. Even though a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard makes the most sense in this type of 
civil proceeding, without a clear mandate for its use, the standard 
changes on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.39  
 On one end of the spectrum, the Eleventh Circuit held that when 
plaintiffs choose not to proffer any evidence at all in support of a 
Rule 23 requirement, they fail to meet their burden of providing suf-
                                                                                                                      
 35. Certifying a class with unreliable evidence may increase the possibility of coercing 
the defendants into settlement. See infra Part VI.A. 
 36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 37. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983); Gary Lawson, 
Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 870 (1992). 
 38. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 
2001) (asking whether the plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient); Caridad v. Metro-North Com-
muter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that the plaintiffs’ statistical evi-
dence supported a finding of commonality); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 
466, 470 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“The appropriate inquiry is whether the statistics ‘are sufficient 
to show . . . the existence of common questions.’” (quoting Hopewell v. Univ. of Pitt., 79 
F.R.D. 689, 693 (W.D. Pa. 1978)); Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 
655, 667 n.14 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (denying class certification because plaintiffs made “little ef-
fort to show how proving the elements of their individual claims [would] also prove the 
claims of the absent class members,” but not stating what constitutes sufficient evidence to 
prove these claims); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. 
Ga. 1997) (finding that the plaintiff offered “sufficient evidence,” but failing to indicate 
what standard the court used to determine sufficiency). 
 39. See generally Part IV.B.2. For additional information on minimizing the rate of 
error in the preponderance of the evidence standard, see Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, 
Probability and Warranted Factfinding, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1075, 1099-1104 (1996). 
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ficient evidence.40 When other courts evaluate expert evidence, they 
have certified classes where the methodologies show a “reasonable 
probability” of establishing the plaintiffs’ claims,41 when plaintiffs 
demonstrate a “colorable method” of proof,42 and even where the pro-
posed methods are not “so insubstantial as to amount to no method 
at all.”43 The Eleventh Circuit held that courts have a duty to conduct 
an independent inquiry into whether the plaintiffs’ evidence satisfies 
Rule 23 regardless of whether defendants contest the issue.44  Yet, 
many courts fail to weigh contested evidence, much less conduct their 
own inquiry.45  
 Contrary to these relaxed evidentiary thresholds, the Supreme 
Court noted that absent clear proof, “significant proof” of the Rule 23 
requirements could justify certifying a class.46 Although the certifica-
tion process contains some flexibility to enhance the usefulness of the 
class action device, the Court stated that “actual, not presumed, con-
formance with Rule 23(a) remains, however, indispensable.”47 The 
Court emphasized that a trial court may certify a class only if it con-
cludes, “after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 
have been satisfied.”48 Consequently, it seems that the Court requires 
at least a preponderance of the evidence standard. When lower 
courts certify classes based on expert evidence that demonstrates 
only a “colorable method” of proof,49 or where the method is not “so 
insubstantial as to amount to no method at all,”50 it may not be more 
likely than not that the plaintiffs satisfied Rule 23(a).  
                                                                                                                      
 40. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1196 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 41. In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 42. In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 170 F.R.D. 524, 531 (M.D. Fla. 
1996).  
 43. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 697 (D. Minn. 1995). 
 44. Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1188. 
 45. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (refusing to weigh opposing expert evidence that offered conflicting opinions on 
whether the plaintiffs could establish common questions of fact for certification). 
 46. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982). 
 47. Id. at 160. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 170 F.R.D. 524, 531 (M.D. Fla. 
1996). In this case, replacement contact lens purchasers brought an antitrust action 
against Johnson & Johnson Vision Products, Inc., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. and CIBA Vision 
Corporation, the largest contact lens manufacturers in the United States, id. at 527. The 
plaintiffs alleged that these manufacturers conspired among themselves, along with two 
trade organizations, to “restrict the supply of replacement contact lenses.” Id. As such, the 
contact lenses were marked-up at “supracompetitive” prices. Id. The district court granted 
the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Id. at 533. In doing so, the court stated that the 
“[p]laintiffs have demonstrated at least a ‘colorable method’ of proving impact at trial . . . . 
That Defendants’ expert disagrees with the methodology and conclusions propounded by 
[the plaintiffs’ expert] is not reason to deny class certification.” Id. at 531 (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
 50. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 697 (D. Minn. 1995). Potash is “a 
mineral typically mined from land deposits,” and is used in the United States for fertilizer 
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 Without a uniform threshold of proof, the amount of proof that 
constitutes “sufficient evidence” may continue to reflect the personal 
preferences of the court rather than the adequacy of the plaintiffs’ 
proof. Courts should affirmatively adopt a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard and determine, after considering all of the evidence, 
whether the plaintiff supplied sufficient proof to satisfy Rule 23(a). 
 Weighing the evidence forces judges to envision how the class ac-
tion might develop, and thus forms an almost inseparable relation-
ship between the prerequisites of a class action and the substantive 
merits.51 Even though a court should not decide the merits of the case 
during certification, it “can and should consider the merits of the case 
to the degree necessary to determine whether the requirements of 
Rule 23 will be satisfied.”52 The post-Eisen decisions demonstrate 
that the rigorous application of Rule 23 requires the court to analyze 
the evidence even if the scrutiny overlaps the merits of the case.53 
Despite the court’s duty to determine whether the plaintiffs satisfied 
Rule 23(a), even in the event that the inquiry touches the merits,54 
judges often err on the side of caution by giving evidence remotely re-
lated to the merits a wide berth.55 As a result, the chances of a court 
certifying a class that, more likely than not, does not meet the Rule 
23 requirements increases.  
 Three general practices hinder the court in making informed and 
fair certification decisions: (1) most courts do not regularly employ 
Daubert standards before admitting expert evidence and can certify a 
class based on flawed evidence, (2) courts do not seriously weigh the 
evidence offered or apply a uniform standard to judge whether the 
plaintiffs produced sufficient proof to satisfy Rule 23, and (3) courts 
                                                                                                                      
production. Id. at 686 n.1. In Potash, fertilizer producers in the United States alleged that 
the potash producers violated the Sherman Act by “conspiring to raise, fix, maintain, and 
stabilize the wholesale price of potash.” Id. at 686.  The fertilizer producer plaintiffs al-
leged that they were injured by having to pay artificially high prices. Id. The district court 
granted their motion. Id. at 700. In its decision to certify the class, the court stated:  
In assessing whether to certify a class, the Court’s inquiry is limited to whether 
or not the proposed methods are so insubstantial as to amount to no method at 
all. This relaxed standard flows from the equitable notion that the wrongdoer 
should not be able to profit by insistence on an unattainable standard of proof. 
Id. at 697 (citations omitted). 
 51. Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1268.  
 52. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 n.15 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
 53. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160; Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12 
(1978); Disposable Contact Lens, 170 F.R.D. at 528 (observing that the principle requiring 
courts not to consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims should not be invoked so rigidly so 
as “to artificially limit a trial court’s examination of the factors necessary to make a rea-
soned determination of whether Rule 23 has been satisfied”); Brief of Amici Curiae Am. 
Bankers Assoc. et al. at 13, In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124 
(2d Cir. 2001); Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1276-77.  
 54. Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1188 n.15. 
 55. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 321 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
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resolve ambiguities in favor of plaintiffs and err on the side of certify-
ing the class.56 Ideally, to make a reasonable and informed decision 
on certification, courts should apply Daubert as the standard for ad-
missibility of expert evidence, weigh opposing expert opinions as well 
as the totality of the evidence, and employ a preponderance of the 
evidence standard to determine the sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
court could then resolve ambiguities in favor of the plaintiffs and err 
on the side of certification.  
III.   THE USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY TO SATISFY RULE 23 
 In negotiating the unpredictable area of class certification, liti-
gants present the courts with numerous expert opinions in the form 
of affidavits and reports.57 These reports may aid the judge in deter-
mining whether the plaintiffs established the requirements in Rule 
23.58 Traditionally, before admitting expert testimony, the testimony 
must survive scrutiny under Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.59 The rules advisory committee drafted the Rules of Evi-
dence to “secure fairness in administration, eliminat[e] unjustifiable 
expense and delay, and promot[e] growth and development of the law 
of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceed-
ings justly determined.”60  
A.   Federal Rule of Evidence 702: Daubert & Kumho Tire 
 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows experts to tes-
tify, so long as they base their testimony on “sufficient facts or data,” 
use “reliable principles and methods,” and apply those principles and 
methods “reliably to the facts of the case.”61 Two Supreme Court deci-
sions, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.62 and Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael,63 provide the foundation for the rule. In 
                                                                                                                      
 56. See In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y 1998). The court in 
Sumitomo noted that “[t]he Second Circuit has directed district courts to apply Rule 23 ac-
cording to a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation.” The court then quoted Green 
v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968), which stated “if there is to be an error 
made, let it be in favor and not against the maintenance of the class action, for it is always 
subject to modification should later developments during the course of the trial so require.” 
Id. While this statement complies with the flexibility in Rule 23, the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that “actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains, however, in-
dispensable.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160. 
 57. Mandi L. Williams, Note, The History of Daubert and Its Effect on Toxic Tort 
Class Action Certification, 22 REV. LITIG. 181, 202 (2003). 
 58. See Nancy J. Moore, Class Action Experts Discuss Key Decisions, New Rules, and 
Litigation Strategies, 4 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 818 (Nov. 14, 2003). 
 59. FED. R. EVID. 702, 703. 
 60. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 61. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 62. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
 63. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
1052  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1041 
 
Daubert, the Court required trial judges to act as “gatekeepers” by 
excluding unreliable and irrelevant scientific testimony.64 In Kumho 
Tire, the question before the Court was whether Daubert’s funda-
mental gatekeeping obligation applied to only scientific testimony, or 
if it applied to all expert testimony.65 In holding that the gatekeeping 
obligation applied to all expert testimony, the Court reiterated that 
Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence give experts tes-
timonial latitude “on the ‘assumption that the expert’s opinion will 
have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his disci-
pline.’”66 The Kumho Court expressed a fundamental concern with 
expert reliability.67 As such, Rule 702 requires ‘“a valid . . . connec-
tion to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.’”68 
 To aid the courts in their gatekeeping function, the Supreme 
Court suggested a non-exclusive checklist to use in assessing expert 
reliability.69 These factors may include: (1) whether the expert’s 
methods or theories can be tested; (2) whether the technique has 
been published and subjected to peer review; (3) the known or poten-
tial rate of error; (4) the existence of standards and controls; and (5) 
whether the method has been generally accepted in the scientific 
community.70  
 In addition to looking at any relevant factors, Rule 702 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence requires the trial court to determine whether 
the expert properly applied the scientifically valid methods and prin-
ciples to the facts of the case.71 This prevents a situation where a 
party would, for example, call a NASA aeronautical engineer to give 
a medical analysis of an asbestos plaintiff.72 Under Rule 702, the ex-
pert must demonstrate a proper basis for any assumptions made 
                                                                                                                      
 64. 509 U.S. at 589. 
 65. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147. 
 66. Id. at 148 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592); see also JOHN W. STRONG, 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 59-60 (5th ed. 1999). 
 67. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149.  
 68. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). 
 69. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note concerning the 2000 amendment. 
 70. Id. The last factor stems from the “general acceptance test” articulated in Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 71. FED. R. EVID. 702. For information on the methodology used in toxic tort cases, 
see Michael C. McCarthy, Note, “Helpful” or “Reasonably Reliable”? Analyzing the Expert 
Witness’s Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
350 (1992). 
 72. In Daubert, the Supreme Court used phases of the moon to give an example on 
relevancy, stating: 
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific 
“knowledge” about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact 
in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable 
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain 
night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was 
unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night. 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). 
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about the facts of the case if he or she wants to give an opinion based 
on those facts.73 
 To decide whether Rule 702 applies to expert testimony, the court 
must ascertain “pursuant to [Federal Rule of Evidence] 104(a), 
whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge 
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact 
in issue.”74 The court must make this determination in all cases 
where the “testimony reflects scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge.”75 Despite the Supreme Court’s all-inclusive language, 
most courts determining whether a class meets the requirements of 
Rule 23 do not apply the Federal Rules of Evidence or perform their 
gatekeeping function during certification.76  
 The changing role of the class certification hearing may partially 
explain why judges refuse to act as gatekeepers during the certifica-
tion process. Traditionally, the court acted as a guardian for the in-
terests of the absent class members and assumed a responsibility to 
adequately protect those interests.77 The entire class action resembled 
a “quasi-administrative” action rather than a traditional lawsuit with 
clearly defined roles for the litigants.78 Today, however, the class cer-
tification hearing resembles a trial where parties vigorously attack 
and defend their positions on certification.  
 Litigants commonly use expert testimony to support or oppose mo-
tions for class certification.79 Yet, the court’s approach to certification 
retains the trappings of traditional administrative procedure and has 
not adjusted to the increased use of expert witnesses. Although this 
Comment will further develop the ways in which courts should adapt 
to the proliferation of experts in Part V, it is first helpful to under-
stand how plaintiffs and defendants use expert opinions during certi-
fication. In general, plaintiffs may rely on an expert to demonstrate 
                                                                                                                      
 73. STRONG, supra note 66, § 13, at 64-65. The fact in issue during class certification 
is whether the class satisfies Rule 23. 
 74. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 (footnote omitted). 
 75. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999). 
 76. See infra Part IV.B. 
 77. Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 43. Today the court should still act as a guardian 
for absent class members; however, it should exercise this duty in a slightly different way. 
In light of the changing environment of class actions, the court should act as a guardian for 
the class by conducting an independent inquiry into whether the plaintiffs sufficiently 
proved the requirements of Rule 23. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 
1181, 1188, 1196 (11th Cir. 2003). In light of the recent charges of blackmail, the court 
need not only to protect the interests of the absent class members, but also the interests of 
the defendants. See infra Part VI.A. 
 78. Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 43. 
 79. Steven Glickstein et al., Does Daubert Apply to Class Certification Hearings?, in 
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE STRATEGIES 423, 425 (PLI Litig. 
Course & Admin. Practice Handbook Series No. H-695, 2003), available at WL 695 PLI/Lit 
425. 
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numerosity, commonality, predominance, and manageability.80 Con-
versely, defendants typically hire experts to counter those of the 
plaintiffs and to opine that the class would be unmanageable if certi-
fied.81  
B.   Numerosity 
 Although in many cases the number of plaintiffs in a putative 
class may be clear-cut, in complex cases expert evidence may sub-
stantially impact the size of a class action and demonstrate the nec-
essary causal chain to establish the class representative’s standing 
as a member of the class.82 No “bright line” test for numerosity exists, 
and courts have certified classes with as few as thirteen members.83 
The plaintiff must provide some evidence or reasonable estimate of 
the number of purported class members to satisfy the numerosity 
analysis.84 To provide evidence of numerosity in complex litigation, 
plaintiffs may use statisticians, hydrologists, engineering geologists, 
economic experts, or even atmospheric experts.85  
 The classic toxic tort case provides a helpful illustration since the 
plaintiff may find it difficult to ascertain the number of potential 
class members without expert testimony on the substance’s geo-
graphical reach.86 First, a toxic tort plaintiff may hire a professional 
chemist with expertise in the particular substance to examine the ac-
tivities surrounding the alleged release as well as the amount, tim-
                                                                                                                      
 80. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 81. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 
(7th Cir. 2002), rev’g in part 205 F.R.D. 503, cert. denied sub nom. Gustafson v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003); Sherrie R. Savett, Trial and Preparation of a 
Securities Class Action Fraud Case from a Plaintiff’s Standpoint, in SECURITIES LITIGA-
TION 11, 14 (PLI Litig. Course Handbook & Admin. Practice Series No. H-509, 1994), 
available at WL 501 PLI/Lit 11 (stating that defendants have abundant financial resources 
that allow them to hire the most impressive and high-quality experts to defeat certifica-
tion); see also infra Part III.D. 
 82. Williams, supra note 57, at 183. 
 83. See Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534-36 (D.N.H. 1971). 
But see Ashe v. Bd. of Elections, 124 F.R.D. 45, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that eleven 
class members were not numerous enough to merit subclass certification). 
 84. Expert witnesses are often necessary to determine numerosity in toxic tort cases. 
See LeAnn Mercer et al., Applicability of Daubert Principles in Toxic Tort Cases, in ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY; HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES, SITE REMEDIATION, AND NEW AGE EN-
FORCEMENT 551, 564 (Oct 25-26, 2001). 
 85. See generally Williams, supra note 57, at 198-200 (discussing the use of chemists, 
toxicologists, and medical experts in establishing causation). 
 86. Geographic distribution may play a considerable role when a small number of 
class members exist and numerosity alone cannot establish the impracticability of joinder. 
Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 80-81; see also Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 
878 (11th Cir. 1986); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 95 F.R.D. 168, 175 (D. Del. 
1982). For a transcript of a speech on toxic tort cases and the role of science, see Christo-
pher H. Buckley, Jr., Toxic Tort Cases: Risk Assessment and Junk Science, 9 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 487 (2000). 
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ing, and method of release.87 In the case of contaminated air, the ex-
pert would assess the number of plaintiffs in a contaminated area by 
taking into account things such as wind and weather; in water con-
tamination cases, a hydrologist might assess the number of people in 
proximity to the affected sources.88 Experts may submit evidence in 
the form of toxic dispersion maps of contaminated areas.89 For exam-
ple, in O’Connor v. Boeing North American, Inc., the engineering ge-
ologist and hydrologist used this type of map to demonstrate how 
chemicals dispersed from a lab through groundwater, migrated into 
the surrounding neighborhoods, and exposed the community to toxic 
substances.90  
 In addition to using experts to establish the extent of the chemical 
release, the plaintiffs, and particularly the class representative, may 
submit blood or urine to a doctor or technician to determine the indi-
vidual’s toxic exposure through laboratory testing.91 The plaintiff 
may then hire an atmospheric chemist to decide whether environ-
mental factors altered the contaminant or whether it remained in its 
original form once it entered the atmosphere.92 Finally, plaintiffs may 
bring in yet another expert to conduct a “plume study” that defines 
where and in what concentration the toxic materials traveled.93 This 
study may help determine the geographical distance traveled by the 
chemical and, consequently, the number of people affected. 
 Although defendants do not typically dispute numerosity,94 the 
size of the class often directly influences the costs of the verdict or 
settlement. Toxic tort claims, in particular, can involve entire com-
munities, and may impact individuals differently according to the 
time the individual spent in the community, the proximity to the 
source of toxins, the length of exposure, and the amount of expo-
sure.95 Consequently, the expert’s analysis may directly affect the 
number of plaintiffs included in the class action.  Plaintiff and de-
                                                                                                                      
 87. Williams, supra note 57, at 198-99.  
 88. Id.; see Christopher H. Buckley, Jr. & Charles H. Haake, Separating the Scien-
tist’s Wheat from the Charlatan’s Chaff: Daubert’s Role in Toxic Tort Litigation, 28 ENVTL. 
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10293, 10298 (1998).  
 89. See O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 320 (C.D. Cal. 1998).  
 90. Id. at 320. In O’Connor, residents who lived near a nuclear testing facility brought 
a motion for class certification against the owner and operators of the facility based on an 
alleged release of radioactive contaminants. Id. at 316-18. The district court certified the 
class. Id. at 342. 
 91. Williams, supra note 57, at 199.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. The Eleventh Circuit has held that courts have an independent duty to inquire 
into the evidence, even if the defendants do not contest its validity. Valley Drug Co. v. Ge-
neva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188, 1196 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 95. See Ellen Relkin, Some Implications of Daubert and Its Potential for Misuse: Mis-
application to Environmental Toxic Tort Cases and Abuse of Rule 706(a) Court-Appointed 
Experts, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2260 (1994).  
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fense counsel may want to vary the numbers depending on the litiga-
tion goals.96 Using the Daubert analysis to examine the validity of 
each side’s expert may help the judge reach a more accurate number. 
 Conducting a Daubert analysis before admitting expert affidavits 
would act as a barrier to unreliable evidence and prevent the court 
from having to revisit the issue of standing or numerosity.97 Yet, 
courts view Daubert with reluctance during certification.98 Although 
the court in O’Connor devoted eight pages of its opinion to expert tes-
timony establishing numerosity, it rejected a motion for a Daubert 
hearing by claiming that the motion went to the merits of the case.99  
C.   Common Issues 
 In addition to proving numerosity, to certify a class, the plaintiffs 
must enumerate specific questions of law or fact common to the 
class.100 This commonality requirement in Rule 23(a)(2) often inter-
twines with the predominance evaluation of Rule 23(b)(3) and 
“tend[s] to merge” with the typicality requirement.101 Although the 
following two sections treat commonality and predominance sepa-
rately, expert testimony on commonality may establish the founda-
tion for predominance. If the plaintiffs establishe predominance, 
commonality will always be present.  
1.   Commonality of Rule 23(a)(2) 
 The court must decide the threshold issue of commonality in Rule 
23(a)(2) before it can further examine the predominance and superi-
ority of commonality under Rule 23(b)(3).102 Commonality exists if 
the plaintiffs “share at least one question of fact or law with the 
grievances of the prospective class.”103 The class members need not 
share all questions of law or fact,104 and plaintiffs can establish com-
                                                                                                                      
 96. Donald C. Arbitblit & William Bernstein, Effective Use of Class Action Procedures 
in California Toxic Tort Litigation, 3 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 435, 444 
(1996). Defendants often want to keep the numbers to a minimum for purposes of damages; 
however, they may want to expand the size of the class for settlement purposes. 
 97. See Williams, supra note 57, at 201.  
 98. See O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 321 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 99. Id. 
 100. FED R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). Note 
that when a class is too large, numerosity alone may establish impracticability and the 
court need not look to any additional factors before refusing to certify the class. See, e.g., 
Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 726 F. Supp. 460, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding joinder of 
127 plaintiffs impracticable). 
 101. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13; Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 59.  
 102. Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 59. 
 103. Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 104. Midwestern Mach. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562, 569 (D. Minn. 2001) (cit-
ing Lockwood Motors, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 162 F.R.D. 569, 575 (D. Minn. 1995)). 
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monality regardless of individual differences in damages.105 Since 
commonality asks whether the issues are susceptible to classwide 
proof, courts may refrain from closely scrutinizing the proof for fear 
of venturing into the merits of the case.106 
 Some plaintiffs hire experts to develop a technique for implement-
ing a common method of proof. In an antitrust suit by airline cus-
tomers, for example, an economist might testify to whether a merger 
caused a “substantial lessening” of competition within relevant mar-
kets, whether all of the class members suffered a common antitrust 
injury, and whether the court could calculate damages using a com-
mon method.107 These expert reports might contend that an airline’s 
airport market share rose significantly, that the airline’s airfares and 
yields increased since the merger, and that entry barriers to a par-
ticular airport were too high.108 The economist could then conclude 
that the increased airfares impacted all the passengers of a particu-
lar airport, thereby establishing commonality.109 Yet, if the economist 
uses a flawed method for gathering information about the markets, 
such as informally surveying ten airport passengers, then the 
economist’s opinion on common proof would amount to little more 
than conjecture and speculation.  
2.   Predominance of Common Issues in Rule 23(b)(3) 
 Although a plaintiff meets the commonality requirement “when 
there is at least one issue, the resolution of which will affect all or a 
significant number of the putative class members,”110 Rule 23(b)(3) 
calls for the additional twin requirements of predominance and supe-
riority.111 To predominate, these common issues must constitute a 
“significant part” of individual cases,112 and the proposed class must 
be “sufficiently cohesive.”113 The plaintiff must further prove that the 
                                                                                                                      
 105. Id. 
 106. Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 666 (N.D. Ga. 2001); see 
infra Part V.B. 
 107. See Midwestern Mach., 211 F.R.D. at 569. In Midwestern Machinery, airline pas-
sengers brought a suit against Northwest Airlines, Inc. alleging that Northwest’s merger 
with Republic Airlines caused “a substantial lessening of competition in violation of” the 
Clayton Act as well as a systemic practice of overcharging its customers. Id. at 564-65. In 
response to a motion for class certification the judge admitted expert reports by an econo-
mist and a professor of civil procedure to help determine whether to certify the action. Id. 
at 566-69. The judge certified the action as a Rule 23(b)(3) action and held that injunctive 
class relief was not appropriate. Id. at 572. 
 108. See id. at 566. 
 109. See id. 
 110. Payne v. Don Bhon Ford, Inc., 1998 WL 131737, at *8 (E.D. La. March 20, 1998) 
(quoting Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 111. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 112. Jenkins v. Raymark Ind., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986); Payne, 1998 WL 
131737, at *8. 
 113. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). 
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issues in the class action “are subject to generalized proof, and thus 
applicable to the class as a whole,” and that these collective issues 
predominate over issues that require individualized proof.114  
 To establish superiority, the plaintiff must prove that a class ac-
tion is the best method of achieving a “fair and efficient adjudication 
of the controversy.”115 The element of superiority reflects the main 
purposes of the class action: preserving judicial resources and guard-
ing against inconsistent results.116 Proving that one fundamental set 
of facts predominates over particularized facts relevant to individual 
claims often presents one of the main obstacles for plaintiffs seeking 
Rule 23(b)(3) certification.117 To overcome this hurdle, plaintiffs use 
experts to explain how the basic facts pertain to each plaintiff.118 
 For example, in Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., the plaintiff tried to 
use an expert to establish a common cause of paint delamination and 
apply it to each putative class representative.119 Since the case 
turned on whether Chrysler fraudulently concealed a paint defect, 
the expert attempted to establish a sole cause for that defect.120 The 
expert declared that “the cause for Ecoat basecoat delamination is 
always ultraviolet rays,” but then hedged that “other causes may 
contribute to or exacerbate the problem.”121 Notably, the court de-
cided, without explanation, that the expert’s testimony survived the 
Daubert analysis.122 However, the court denied certification because 
“the experts [did] not agree that ultraviolet rays [were] always the 
root cause of delamination, or that they ever [were] the only cause.”123 
Since proof of injury would require a “vehicle-by-vehicle” assessment, 
                                                                                                                      
 114. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 116. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983); Am. Pipe & Constr. 
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); First Fed. v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 
1989). Ironically, when courts do not use a standard burden of proof, such as a preponder-
ance of the evidence, this undermines the principle of guarding against inconsistent re-
sults, not between similar plaintiffs, but on a broad scale. 
 117. Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 287.  
 118. Id. 
 119. 191 F.R.D. 441, 451 (E.D. Pa. 2000). In Sanneman, the class representative, 
Christina Sanneman, brought a putative class action against Chrysler Corporation “on be-
half of Illinois owners and former owners” of certain makes and models of cars for damages 
allegedly incurred as a result of painting the vehicles with a defective prime coat. Id. at 
443-44. On a motion for class certification, the judge held that although the plaintiff estab-
lished numerosity, commonality and typicality, Christina Sanneman was not an adequate 
class representative of new car owners, and individual issues would predominate over 
common issues. Id. at 456. Consequently, the court ruled that the class action did not pro-
vide the superior method for resolving the claims. Id. at 456-57. 
 120. Id. at 451. 
 121. Id. (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. at 451 n.16. 
 123. Id. at 451. 
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the generalized causation and proof did not predominate over indi-
vidualized proof.124  
 Some courts provide a more hospitable environment for plaintiffs’ 
experts by relaxing the amount of proof needed to satisfy the Rule 23 
requirements and by resolving ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff.125 
In In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, both parties 
proffered reports by economists that gave competing opinions on 
whether the plaintiffs could litigate their complex antitrust claims as 
a class action.126 Even though the economists’ testimony offered op-
posing views on generalized proof, the district court admitted the 
plaintiffs’ expert testimony for the purpose of supporting class certi-
fication because it was not “so flawed that it would be inadmissible 
as a matter of law.”127 The district court refused to inquire into the 
experts’ disagreement over conclusions of generalized proof even 
though the disagreement raised the issue of whether the plaintiffs 
actually met the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement.128 After refusing to ad-
dress the difference of opinion, the court claimed that an evidentiary 
dispute over the proof was not a valid reason to deny class certifica-
tion.129 Although a dispute in and of itself is not a valid reason to 
deny certification, if a court considers the disagreement, it could find 
that the plaintiffs did not establish common proof, which is a valid 
reason to deny certification.  
 On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court and 
stated that at the certification stage a trial court need ask only 
“whether plaintiffs’ expert evidence is sufficient to demonstrate 
common questions of fact warranting certification of the proposed 
class, not whether the evidence will ultimately be persuasive.”130 As 
such, the court admitted the plaintiffs’ expert testimony and refused 
to consider the opposing expert’s opinion when evaluating the evi-
dence.131 The Second Circuit did not furnish a standard for its district 
                                                                                                                      
 124. Id. The court also denied certification because the class representative could not 
adequately represent all the interests of the class. Id. at 456. 
 125. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 134 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
 126. Id. In Visa Check/MasterMoney, large commercial retailers, retail associations, 
and smaller merchants joined forces to bring an antitrust action that challenged the credit 
card association’s rules requiring stores that accepted the association’s credit cards to also 
accept their debit cards. Judge John Gleeson certified the class, and the credit card asso-
ciations appealed to the Second Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the district court’s 
certification. Id. at 129-32, 147. 
 127. Id. at 135. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. The court noted that it would not engage in the “statistical dueling” of experts. Id.; 
see also In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197, 217 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“To the 
extent that this discussion involves a battle of experts, it [sic] not appropriate for the Court 
to determine which expert is more credible at this time.”). But see West v. Prudential Sec., 
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courts to use in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, but judg-
ing from the Circuit’s other preferences and instructions, sufficiency 
appears to be a fluid requirement with little protection for defen-
dants. This Circuit openly favors a liberal application of the require-
ments of Rule 23,132 encourages courts to err on the side of certifying 
classes,133 does not require plaintiffs to state a cause of action,134 and 
generally deems methodology that is not “fatally flawed” a suffi-
ciently credible basis for certification.135  
 By refusing to “weigh conflicting expert evidence or engage in ‘sta-
tistical dueling’ of experts,”136 the Second Circuit appears to accept 
the plaintiffs’ expert evidence as true for purposes of proof. The Su-
preme Court, however, requires “actual, not presumed conformance” 
with Rule 23(a), and insists that courts conduct a “rigorous analysis” 
to determine compliance.137 Although the Second Circuit employed a 
limited Daubert analysis to determine whether the plaintiffs’ expert 
testimony was fatally flawed,138 it should have applied a full Daubert 
analysis given its subsequent weak scrutiny of proof and bias in favor 
of certification.  
 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Third,139 Fifth,140 Seventh,141 and 
Eleventh142 Circuits recognize that the court is not required to accept 
                                                                                                                      
Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring the district courts to hold evidentiary 
hearings to choose between competing expert perspectives if necessary). 
 132. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Korn v. 
Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1208-09 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 
F.R.D. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 133. Green, 406 F.2d at 298; Sumitomo, 182 F.R.D. at 88. 
 134. The Supreme Court has stated that “the class determination generally involves 
considerations that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s 
cause of action.’” Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (quoting Coopers & Ly-
brand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978)).  
 135. Visa Check/MasterMoney, 280 F.3d at 135. 
 136. Id. Since the court did not take the defense expert’s testimony into account, no 
“dueling” occurred and the court seemed to use the appearance of experts on both sides as 
an excuse to certify the plaintiff. Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 291. Rather than 
performing its judicial function, the court basically gave “judicial power to the plaintiffs, 
who can obtain certification just by hiring a competent expert.” West, 282 F.3d at 938. 
Since courts allow defendants to submit evidence on their behalf, courts do not openly treat 
the defendants as passive, dispassionate observers. Yet, when the court refuses to consider 
the defendant’s opposing expert’s testimony and rejects Daubert challenges, the court 
seems to relegate the defendant to a less active position. 
 137. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160. 
 138. Visa Check/MasterMoney, 280 F.3d at 132 n.4. 
 139. See, e.g., Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir 2001). On 
Rule 23(f) review, the Third Circuit has never allowed a class to stand. Jennifer K. Fardy, 
Disciplining the Class: Interlocutory Review of Class Action Certification Decisions Under 
Rule 23(f), 2003 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. CLASS ACTIONS & DERIVATIVE SUITS REP. 3, 9, available 
at http://www.seyfarth.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/fardy.PDF (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). 
 140. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 141. But see In re Hartford Sales Practices Litig., 192 F.R.D. 592, 602 (D. Minn. 1999) 
(“In determining whether class certification is appropriate under Rule 23, the court must 
accept as true the allegations in the complaint.”). 
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expert allegations in the complaint as true, but rather may make the 
necessary factual and legal inquiries to verify that the plaintiff pro-
vided sufficient proof of the certification requirements.143 In accor-
dance with the reading of General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,144 after 
admitting the evidence, these courts weigh expert opinions offered by 
both parties even if their inquiry into the underlying considerations 
of Rule 23 overlaps the merits of the case.145  
 In Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., a securi-
ties fraud case, the Third Circuit carefully evaluated the offered 
proof and discounted the plaintiffs’ expert evidence as an attempt to 
“gloss over” the individual proof of injury requirement.146 The plain-
tiffs contended that their expert could present a mathematical for-
mula to measure classwide damages,147 and could construct an alloca-
tion plan from this formula.148 Although the Newton court did not 
conduct, or even mention, a Daubert analysis, it held that the ex-
pert’s plan was not an acceptable means to measure classwide dam-
ages.149 The court indicated that it would accept the proposed tech-
nique “when dealing with a misrepresentation or omission affecting 
the securities market uniformly,” but the method could not be used 
“as a means to arrive at some figure which can then be allocated 
among the proposed class members, regardless of whether each 
member suffered actual loss.”150 Translated into the terminology of 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the expert did not reliably 
apply the technique to the facts of the case.151 
                                                                                                                      
 142. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003) (re-
quiring the court to conduct an independent inquiry into whether the plaintiffs met the 
Rule 23 requirements even if the requirement is uncontested by defendants). 
 143. See, e.g., West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002); Szabo v. 
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001). The court in Szabo rejected the 
Eisen rule as a bar to the “merits inquiry” when a look at the merits was relevant to one of 
the Rule 23 requirements. Courts do not specify the burden of proof as a preponderance of 
the evidence. However, since courts generally use this standard in civil cases and no cases 
provide otherwise, it will be the presumed standard for purposes of this Comment. 
 144. 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). 
 145. Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676. Courts should perform a full Daubert admissibility test for 
the experts of both the plaintiff and defendant then decide whether a preponderance of the 
evidence meets the requirements of Rule 23. 
 146. 259 F.3d 154, 188 (3d Cir. 2001). In Newton, investors wanted to certify a class 
against their broker-dealers at Merrill Lynch for breaching their duty of best execution. Id. 
at 162. The Third Circuit took the case on an interlocutory appeal, and held that although 
the class met the requirements in Rule 23(a), it did not pass the superiority and predomi-
nance requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) so it could not be maintained as a class action. Id. at 
193. 
 147. Id. at 188. 
 148. In re Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. 391, 397 (D.N.J. 1999); see also Newton, 259 F.3d 
at 188. 
 149. Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D at 397. 
 150. Id. 
 151. FED. R. EVID. 702. At least one of the district courts in the Third Circuit retreated 
from this truth-finding approach to adopt the reasoning of the Second Circuit. See Nichols 
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D.   Manageability Problems 
 Although experts opining about numerosity and commonality 
typically rely on scientific or technical data, experts employed to es-
tablish manageability rely on statutes and cases to give legal opin-
ions on matters such as choice-of-law issues.152 In certifying a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action, the court should consider, under Rule 
23(b)(3)(D), the “difficulties likely to be encountered in the manage-
ment of a class action.”153 Commonly known as “manageability,” this 
factor often prevents the court from certifying putative nationwide 
class actions that would require it to apply numerous state laws to 
differing claims.154 Doing so would defeat the superiority of the class 
action mechanism for resolving disputes.155  
 Defendants may claim that divergent state laws present “insuper-
able obstacles” by requiring the court to apply numerous states’ laws 
as well as instruct jurors on each state’s law and the corresponding 
class action claim.156 Plaintiffs typically respond by employing ex-
perts, usually law school professors or experienced attorneys, to pro-
duce methodology and reports contending that the variation among 
the laws fails to predominate over common legal issues.157 The plain-
tiffs’ experts then conclude that legal difficulties are either non-
existent or negligible.158  
                                                                                                                      
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. CIV.A. 00-6222, 2003 WL 302352 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 
2003). In Nichols, the court held that the expert’s opinion did not need to satisfy the 
Daubert requirements to be admissible at the class certification stage. Id. at *4. Instead, 
the court quoted the Second Circuit as saying that the court, at the class certification 
stage, “may not weigh conflicting expert evidence or engage in statistical dueling of ex-
perts.” Id. at *6. 
 152. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 
(7th Cir. 2002), rev’g in part 205 F.R.D. 503, cert. denied sub nom. Gustafson v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003). 
 153. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
 154. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1012. 
 155. See, e.g., id. (decertifying a class action because the court would have to apply the 
laws of all fifty states, thereby making the class unmanageable).  
 156. See, e.g., id.; Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 286.  
 157. See Midwestern Mach. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562 (D. Minn. 2001). 
 158. Joel S. Feldman et al., Expert Witnesses in Insurance Class Actions and Individ-
ual Classes—Defense Perspective, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY; CONFERENCE ON LIFE 
AND HEALTH INSURANCE LITIGATION 249, 271-72 (May 11-12, 2000); Davis & Kowalski, su-
pra note 25, at 286. Judges are increasingly less hospitable to this type of “hired gun” ex-
pert. One court noted that: 
[F]ar too frequently in the current legal system the use of professional expert 
witnesses has become rampant. That is to say, that instead of utilizing profes-
sionals that work in a specific field to comment and give learned opinions on 
certain subjects, attorneys turn to “guns for hire” whose main job or means of 
living is generated from giving expert testimony. The Court fears that this 
trend will result, if it has not already resulted, in supposed experts not utilizing 
scientific methods to render an opinion but rather by twisting scientific meth-
ods to produce a result that will support the case of those footing the bill. 
Rivera Pomales v. Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., 217 F.R.D. 290, 295 (D.P.R. 2003). 
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 The Third Circuit grants its district courts’ evaluation of manage-
ability “a wide range of discretion” since a district court “generally 
has a greater degree of expertise and familiarity [with manageabil-
ity] than does the appellate court.”159 Despite this deference, the 
Third Circuit hesitated to rely on the plaintiffs’ expert’s “formulaic 
nostrum” due to the consequences of certifying an unmanageable 
class.160 Certifying an unmanageable class wastes judicial resources, 
precludes efficient adjudication, and undermines the function of the 
class action mechanism.  
 Other courts, however, welcome the aid of legal scholars on legal 
issues.161 The court, in Midwestern Machinery v. Northwest Airlines, 
Inc., accepted an affidavit from a dean and professor of civil proce-
dure from the Hastings College of Law in spite of the plaintiffs’ claim 
that the affidavit constituted an inadmissible legal opinion.162 To ad-
mit the affidavit, the court reasoned that the affidavit was not “pure 
legal opinion” because it discussed the facts of the case and applied 
the law.163  
 In In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Tires Products Liability Litiga-
tion, a putative nationwide class action with plaintiffs that resided in 
twenty-seven different states, the court welcomed relevant facts re-
garding the choice-of-law analysis.164 Choice-of-law usually bears di-
rectly on a class’s manageability.165 In Bridgestone/Firestone, one of 
                                                                                                                      
 159. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 191 (3d Cir. 
2001) (quoting Link v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 550 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1977)); In 
re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986). However, not all appellate courts 
are this permissive with regards to manageability. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 
F.3d at 1012. 
 160. Newton, 259 F.3d at 191. For a brief synopsis of the Newton case, see supra note 
146. 
 161. See Midwestern Mach., 211 F.R.D. at 568-69. 
 162. Id. For a brief synopsis of the Midwestern Machinery case, see supra note 107. 
 163. Midwestern Mach., 211 F.R.D. at 568. 
 164. 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Ind. 2001). In the Bridgestone/Firestone case, buyers and 
lessees of Ford Explorer SUVs equipped with Firestone tires brought prospective class ac-
tion complaints against both Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. and Ford Motor Company. Al-
though the district court certified the class, Judge Easterbrook, on appeal, held that the 
proposed class was not manageable either as a nationwide class action or as an action with 
classes certified for each of the fifty states. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002), rev’g in part 205 F.R.D. 503, cert. denied 
sub nom. Gustafson v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003). 
 165. Many plaintiffs attempt to simplify the legal framework for prosecuting state law-
based claims in nationwide class actions by simplifying the choice-of-law analysis. See 
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Class-Certification of Non-Federal Question Claims: Strategies for 
Plaintiffs, in NON-FEDERAL QUESTION CLASS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL COURTS:  PROSECUTION 
& DEFENSE STRATEGIES 25, 33-35 (PLI Litig. Course & Admin. Practice Handbook Series 
No. H-660, 2001), available at WL 660 PLI/Lit 25. Federal courts must apply the proce-
dural laws of the forum state. The conflict-of-laws analysis is considered procedural, and 
federal courts apply the forum state’s rules. See Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1015. 
States use various methods to determine what law will apply to tort causes of action. 
Methods for determining the choice-of-law include: the “interest analysis,” which applies 
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the plaintiffs’ experts on legal matters claimed there was sufficient 
uniformity across the states to try the class claims in a singular pro-
ceeding.166 The defendants maintained that it was “improper to offer 
‘expert’ opinions on legal issues relevant to class certification.”167 The 
district court disagreed. For purposes of proffered experts’ opinions, 
the judge established “sufficient boundaries” around those opinions 
to preclude the affidavits from “imping[ing] on [the court’s] judgment 
or usurp[ing] [the court’s] own application of legal principles to the 
facts and the issues.”168 On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit held 
that a court could not manage the litigation as a nationwide or a 
statewide class action.169 Consequently, it reversed the district court’s 
decision to certify the class.170  
 Courts generally apply Federal Rule of Evidence 704 when admit-
ting expert testimony relating to legal opinions.171 This rule expressly 
permits testimony or opinions on the ultimate issue to be decided.172 
However, the opinion must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 
704 “does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions.”173 Tradi-
                                                                                                                      
the law of the state whose interests would be more impaired if the court did not apply its 
own state law; the doctrine of lex loci delicti, which applies the law of the place of the in-
jury or wrong; the “significant relationship” test, which uses the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS to determine which state has a most significant relationship to both 
the occurrence and the parties; the combined modern method, which applies the law of the 
state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the is-
sue; the lex fori rule, which applies the law of the forum state; and the balancing test, 
which applies the sounder rule of law. See Bates v. Superior Court, 749 P.2d 1367, 1369 
(Ariz. 1988) (applying the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS); Washington 
Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1078 (Cal. 2001) (applying an interest 
analysis); Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 210 S.E.2d 854, 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) 
(applying the law of the place of the injury or wrong); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 
549 A.2d 1187, 1191-92 (N.H. 1988) (applying a balancing test); Cooney v. Osgood Mach., 
Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 284 (N.Y. 1993) (applying the combined modern method). Generally, 
within each state’s conflict-of-law provision, courts treat the choice-of-laws issue the same 
for different types of torts. Courts that employ a balancing test may weigh some factors 
more heavily depending on the type of tort claim. See Judge v. Am. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 
1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 1990).  
 166. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. 
Ind. 2001), order rev’d in part, 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002), cert denied sub nom. Gustaf-
son v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003). 
 167. Memorandum of Law In Support of Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Declarations 
of Samuel Issacharoff & E. Hunter Taylor at 1, In Re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (No. IP 00-9373-C-B/S, MDL No. 1373). 
 168. Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification, at 7-8, In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (No. 
IP 00-9373-C-B/S, MDL No. 1373).  The district court certified the class. Subsequently, the 
Seventh Circuit decertified the class. Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1021. 
 169. Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1018.  The Seventh Circuit held that the na-
tionwide class was not manageable because claims would need to be adjudicated under the 
laws of many different states. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1021. 
 171. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note. 
 172. Id. 
 173. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note. 
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tionally, to use expert testimony the proponent must establish that 
(1) the subject of the inference is so integrally “related to a science, 
profession, business, or occupation” that it is beyond the knowledge 
of the lay person and (2) that the witness has sufficient skill or 
knowledge in the field about which he or she will testify.174 Although 
judges retain some discretion in administering this rule,175 the dan-
ger in the class certification setting is that the judge will not apply 
the rules at all. Thus far, courts have not strictly applied the Rules of 
Evidence during class certification. Consequently, the court may ad-
mit expert legal opinions on manageability without employing the 
evidentiary safeguards of Rule 702 or 704. 
IV.   THE USE OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CLASS 
CERTIFICATION 
 Unquestionably, expert opinions on manageability and other certi-
fication requirements may help the judge rule on complex certifica-
tion issues. As far back as 1901, Judge Learned Hand remarked, 
“[n]o one will deny that the law should in some way effectively use 
expert knowledge wherever it will aid in settling disputes. The only 
question is as to how it can do so best.”176 In today’s technology filled 
world, litigants increasingly rely on expert evidence.177 Yet, judging 
from the courts’ inconsistent approaches to admitting expert affida-
vits, courts still grapple with how best to handle them.178 In deciding 
how to address expert opinions during certification, courts should 
first return to the goals and purposes of both the class action and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence aim to se-
cure fairness by promoting the growth and development of the laws 
of evidence.179 Likewise, class actions seek to increase fairness by 
eliminating inconsistent results.180 
 A.   The Applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Pre-Daubert 
 Despite the straightforward aims of the class action and the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, the judiciary’s current refusal to apply the 
rules in class certification hearings began with one judge’s misinter-
pretation of the rules.181 Federal Rules of Evidence 101 and 1101 gov-
                                                                                                                      
 174. STRONG, supra note 66, § 13, at 58-59. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testi-
mony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1901). 
 177. Dawson, supra note 1, at 2051; Kelly & Holley, supra note 1, at 6.  
 178. See infra Part IV.B. 
 179. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 180. See First Fed. v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 181. See Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398, 401 n.2 (S.D. Mich. 1976), rev’d on 
other grounds, 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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ern the applicability of the rules, and apply them generally to civil 
actions and proceedings.182 Rule 1101 contains specific exceptions for 
things such as proceedings before grand juries.183 Even though Rule 
1101 contains no exception for class certification hearings, a district 
court judge decided that the evidence rules did not apply during cer-
tification.184  
 This judge presided over the case of Thompson v. Board of Educa-
tion, in which the defendants objected that the plaintiffs’ evidence 
did not meet certain foundational requirements.185 In denying the 
motion to strike the evidence, the judge observed that Rule 1101(b) 
states that the Rules of Evidence “apply generally to civil actions and 
proceedings,” but decided that the rules “need not be viewed as bind-
ing during a hearing on such preliminary matters as class certifica-
tion when a full scale evidentiary hearing may not be absolutely nec-
essary.”186 The judge then quoted Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin out of 
context and said:  
In Eisen, the Court said that a class action hearing ‘of necessity . . . 
is not accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures appli-
cable to civil trials.’ . . . Such a view of the Rules is consistent with 
Rule 102’s mandate to construe the Rules in a manner so as to 
avoid unjustifiable expense and delay without negatively affecting 
the just determination of the merits of the case.187 
The judge omitted the beginning of the Supreme Court’s quotation, 
which expressed a concern for protecting defendants.188 The begin-
ning of the Court’s quote stated that “a preliminary determination of 
the merits may result in substantial prejudice to a defendant” since 
such a hearing may not employ traditional rules.189 The Court never 
clarified which “traditional rules” would be missing.190  
 The judge in Thompson disregarded the bias and prejudice inher-
ent in an unreliable evidentiary foundation, and refused to take a 
                                                                                                                      
 182. FED. R. EVID. 101, 1101(b). 
 183. Id. at 1101(d)(2). 
 184. Thompson, 71 F.R.D. at 401 n.2. In Thompson, female teachers brought a Title 
VII action against multiple Michigan school districts to challenge the schools’ 
sick/disability leave provisions. The teachers alleged that the provisions treated pregnancy 
differently than other temporary disabilities. The district court certified the case as a class 
action. Id. at 418. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. (internal quotations admitted). But see Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank, N.A., 
880 F.2d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying the Federal Rules of Evidence in a Rule 23 
fairness hearing); see also infra note 199. 
 187. Thompson, 71 F.R.D. at 401-02 n.2 (internal citation omitted). 
 188. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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closer look to avoid “unjustifiable expense and delay.”191 The caveat is 
that Federal Rule of Evidence 102 also provides that the evidentiary 
rules “shall be construed to secure fairness in administration.”192 The 
view that employing the Rules of Evidence during certification hear-
ings will cause unjustifiable expense and delay fails to consider the 
increased use of experts at this stage, the time consumed in decerti-
fying a class erroneously certified on unreliable expert testimony, the 
possibility of appealing certification decisions, and the coercion to 
settle after certification.193  
 By refusing to conduct a proper Daubert analysis, the court adds 
unjustifiable expense and delay by allowing plaintiffs with flawed 
evidence to proceed to trial.194 This holds true particularly in light of 
some courts’ willingness to both resolve doubts in favor of the plain-
tiffs and certify classes with less than a preponderance of the evi-
dence.195 In today’s context, continued refusal to employ safeguards 
for evidentiary reliability undermines fairness in administration and 
actually leads to continued delay through certification appeals.196  
 The better view of the Rules of Evidence comes from the rules 
themselves. According to Rule 101, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
“govern proceedings in the courts of the United States . . . to the ex-
tent and with the exceptions stated in rule 1101.”197 Rule 1101 does 
not list “class certification hearings” among its exceptions.198 The 
Seventh Circuit, in Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., held 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence applied to proceedings under Rule 
23 and specifically noted that “[f]airness hearings conducted under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) are not among the proceedings excepted from 
the Rules of Evidence.”199 
                                                                                                                      
 191. FED. R. EVID. 102; Thompson, 71 F.R.D. at 401-02 n.2. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure also provides that the rules “shall be construed and administered to se-
cure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 192. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 193. See infra Part VI.A. 
 194. Courts may certify a class based on flawed evidence so long as the evidence is not 
so flawed as to be inadmissible as a matter of law. Vickers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 204 
F.R.D. 476, 479 (D. Kan. 2001). 
 195. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Sumitomo Copper 
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 
170 F.R.D. 524, 531-32 (M.D. Fla. 1996); In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 688-
89 (D. Minn. 1995). 
 196. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (hearing and granting an appeal to decertify a class action); see also infra note 
317.  
 197. FED. R. EVID. 101. 
 198. See id. at 1101(d). 
 199. 880 F.2d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 1989). In Mars, Judge Easterbrook observed:  “The 
Federal Rules of Evidence ‘govern proceedings in the courts of the United States . . . to the 
extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101.’ The exceptions, listed in Rule 1101(d), 
include proceedings such as extradition and sentencing in criminal cases.” Id. (internal ci-
tations omitted). 
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 Due, in part, to the Supreme Court’s lack of clarification in Eisen 
as to which “traditional rules” would be missing from class certifica-
tion,200 courts admit expert evidence that lacks the evidentiary safe-
guards typically employed during trial. Courts use Eisen as a justifi-
cation for both disregarding the Federal Rules of Evidence and mak-
ing certification decisions without weighing the substance or amount 
of offered proof.201 This combination contradicts the goals and pur-
poses of both the class action mechanism and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. As a result, judges have certified classes based on newspa-
per articles and hearsay.202    
B.   Judicial Treatment of Daubert in Recent Years 
 Although conducting a Daubert analysis before admitting expert 
evidence would foster the restoration of fairness and the goals of the 
class action, many courts refuse to use Daubert during class certifica-
tion. This reluctance, however, has not prevented litigants from rais-
ing Daubert challenges to the admissibility of expert affidavits.203 
These challenges received various levels of rejection and only limited 
success. Yet, the courts’ rationale for rejection provides insight into 
how to dispel their Daubert concerns.  
                                                                                                                      
 200. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). 
 201. See, e.g., Visa Check/MasterMoney, 280 F.3d at 135 (holding that the plaintiffs’ 
expert’s testimony is only inadmissible if it is so flawed as to be inadmissible as a matter of 
law and refusing to engage in the “statistical dueling” of experts); In re Microcrystalline 
Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 79, 83 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (refusing to consider the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence at the class certification stage); In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Silzone 
Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 01-1396 JRTFLN, 2003 WL 1589527, at *11 (D. 
Minn. March 27, 2003) (refusing to analyze the evidence of the medical expert under 
Daubert); Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. Civ.A. 00-6222, 2003 WL 302352, at 
*4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003) (holding that the plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony need not be suffi-
cient under Daubert to be admissible); Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers, Inc. v. Newport Ad-
hesives & Composites, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (denying defendant’s mo-
tion to strike and employing only a lower Daubert standard); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 478 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (admitting testimony to show commonality that 
was sufficient only to make a marginal showing of commonality); Midwestern Mach. v. 
N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562, 565-66 (D. Minn. 2001) (allowing Daubert only to the 
extent that it prevents methodology that is “so apparently flawed”). 
 202. Paxton v. Union Nat’l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 562 n.14 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Hearsay tes-
timony may be admitted to demonstrate typicality.”); see In re Hartford Sales Practices 
Litig., 192 F.R.D. 592, 597 (D. Minn. 1999) (concluding that considering newspaper articles 
during class certification is appropriate); David Minvielle, Comment, Use of the Hearsay 
Objection in Class Certification Hearings to Promote Preliminary Evaluation on the Merits 
of the Case, 45 LOY. L. REV. 585, 600 (1999). 
 203. The scope of this Comment is limited to federal class actions, however many state 
courts have addressed the same issues. See, e.g., Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co., 859 So. 2d 
1255, 1258-59 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding that the expert’s methodology did not show 
class injury or establish questions of law or fact common to the proposed class); Howe v. 
Microsoft Corp., 656 N.W.2d 285, 295 (N.D. 2003) (stating that it was not appropriate to 
engage in a Daubert analysis during certification); In re S.D. Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 657 
N.W.2d 668, 675 (S.D. 2003) (applying a lower Daubert standard to determine whether the 
expert’s testimony rests on both a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand). 
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1.   Daubert Denied 
 A number of district courts dismiss Daubert motions during class 
certification as premature. One court feared that this sort of analysis 
went to the merits of the case and denied the defendant’s motions.204 
In another court, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs’ expert 
based his opinion on unreliable methodology.205 Not only did this dis-
trict court refuse to evaluate the expert’s methodology, it stated that 
“[o]n a motion for class certification, the Court cannot, and indeed 
should not, engage in the [Daubert] analysis.”206 Therefore, before 
trial the defendants filed a motion to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert 
witness and supported this motion with their own MIT expert.207 De-
nying the motion again, the court remarked that “Chief Justice 
Rehnquist surely did not intend the proceeding he created in Daubert 
to devolve into yet another battle of the experts.”208  
 Although the court in Vickers v. General Motors Corp. also de-
clined to engage in a Daubert analysis, it noted that “a court should 
not ‘certify a class . . . on the basis of an expert opinion so flawed that 
it is inadmissible as a matter of law.”’209 The Vickers court seemed to 
balance this minimal standard for admitting expert evidence with a 
local Kansas rule that required the plaintiff to present an evidentiary 
basis demonstrating that the action was “properly maintainable.”210 
The plaintiffs’ expert admitted during the hearing that his report re-
                                                                                                                      
 204. O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 321 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 205. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 229, 234 (D. Minn. 
2001). 
 206. Id. 
 207. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No.Civ. 00-MDL-1328(PAM), 2003 
WL 244729, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2003). This citation refers to the hearing on the de-
fendants’ motion to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert witness after certification. The court notes 
that proponents of an expert witness must prove admissibility by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. (citing Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
 208. In re Monosodium Glutamate, 2003 WL 244729, at *1. It was actually Justice 
Blackmun, not Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the majority opinion in Daubert. Justice 
Rehnquist filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part with the ma-
jority. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993). Justice Rehnquist 
joined the majority opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, which Justice Breyer au-
thored. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Justice Breyer states, “[w]e conclude that Daubert’s general 
holding—setting forth the trial judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ obligation—applies not only to 
testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and 
‘other specialized’ knowledge.” Id. at 141. The court makes no reference to, and conse-
quently, no exception for a “battle of the experts.” 
 209. 204 F.R.D. 476, 479 (D. Kan. 2001). In Vickers, property owners who lived near 
the General Motors plant brought an action against General Motors for damaging their 
land and cars by releasing sulphuric acid into the air. On the motion for class certification, 
the district court held that owners’ proposed definition of the class, although subject to re-
finement based on further development, was insufficient to support certification. Id. at 
478. In addition, the judge noted that the owners’ expert relied on a diagram which he did 
not understand and the opposing expert’s model provided persuasive contrary evidence. Id. 
at 478-79. 
 210. Id. at 479. 
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lied on evidence with various flaws.211 Consequently, the court denied 
class certification since the proposed class definition lacked a suffi-
cient evidentiary basis.212  
2. Formal Daubert Analysis Rejected but Courts Claim to 
Scrutinize the Evidence 
 Some courts reject a strict application of Daubert; however, as 
stated by the court in Bacon v. Honda of America Manufacturing, 
Inc., they “will carefully scrutinize [the] expert testimony to deter-
mine whether it in fact supports the certification of a class in [the] 
case.”213 True to its word, the Bacon court scrutinized the evidence 
and denied class certification.214 If a court refuses to conduct a full 
Daubert analysis, then it should at least follow Bacon and seriously 
analyze the proffered evidence to decide whether the plaintiff proved 
the requirements of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.215 
 Although the court in In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litiga-
tion also claimed it would carefully scrutinize the plaintiffs’ evi-
dence,216 unlike Bacon, it fell short of its own standard. The court be-
gan by postponing a Daubert analysis until trial, and proposed a 
“new” evidentiary inquiry for use during class certification.217 This 
query asked whether the expert methodology “will comport with the 
basic principles of econometric theory, will have any probative value, 
and will primarily use evidence that is common to all members of the 
proposed class.”218 Translated into “Daubert terminology,” the court 
examines the reliability and relevance of the expert’s methodology.  
                                                                                                                      
 211. Id. at 478. 
 212. Id. at 479. 
 213. 205 F.R.D. 466, 471 (S.D. Ohio 2001); see also In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Silzone 
Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 01-1396 JRTFLN, 2003 WL 1589527, at *11 
n.14 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2003) (citing Bacon, 205 F.R.D. at 469-71). In Bacon, African-
American employees brought an employment discrimination suit against Honda, alleging 
that Honda engaged in a pattern and practice of minority discrimination. The court denied 
their motion for class certification since the employees did not establish the requirements 
of Rule 23(a) with respect to the disparate treatment claims. 205 F.R.D. at 490. 
 214. Bacon, 205 F.R.D. at 490. 
 215. Bacon did not specify what burden of proof was used to evaluate the sufficiency of 
the evidence. 
 216. 996 F. Supp. 18, 26 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Litigants in this case sought damages and 
equitable relief pursuant to the Clayton Act as a remedy for alleged violations of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. The plaintiffs alleged that there was a conspiracy to artificially 
maintain the price of polypropylene carpet and motioned for class certification. The district 
court granted the motion. Id. at 30. 
 217. Id. at 26. 
 218. Id. Ironically, this same court failed to mention its own test four years later when 
it refused to address “the full panoply of issues relevant to the Daubert analysis.” Reid v. 
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 661 (N.D. Ga. 2001). In Reid, the court 
refused to certify the class since the expert “admitted in his deposition that his reports con-
tain[ed] numerous errors including mathematical mistakes, the inclusion of wrong and 
misleading tables, counting as zeros disparities that really were not zeros, and missing an 
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 In its Rule 23(b)(3) analysis, the court required the plaintiffs to 
produce “sufficient evidence” to support a “reasonable conclusion” 
that they would use common evidence.219 Yet, the court did not insist 
that the plaintiffs eliminate the possibility that the common evidence 
(the pricing structure) moved in different directions, which would 
completely undermine predominance.220 Nor did the court require the 
plaintiffs’ expert to prove the existence of a pricing structure with 
any statistical evidence.221 Instead, the court “readily agree[d]” that 
the plaintiffs’ evidence might not establish a common relationship, 
but noted that the evidence was not “worthless” or “inherently 
faulty” so it certified the class.222 Although it initially seemed that 
the court would actually weigh the evidence to determine whether 
the plaintiffs offered sufficient proof to support a reasonable conclu-
sion of predominance, the court ultimately certified the class with a 
cursory review of unsubstantiated, speculative evidence.  
 A Pennsylvania district court relied on the analysis in In re Poly-
propylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation as persuasive precedent that 
courts need not ever consider whether an expert’s opinion would be 
admissible under Daubert during certification.223 In reaching this 
conclusion, the judge reasoned that a Daubert inquiry would inap-
propriately require plaintiffs to fully evaluate all of their data at the 
preliminary stage of class certification.224 While it may be true that 
plaintiffs should not have to evaluate all data prior to certification, to 
the extent that the plaintiffs rely on both the data and the experts 
interpreting and collecting the data to satisfy the Rule 23 require-
ments, they should prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the evidence sufficiently supports those requirements. To require less 
allows the court to certify classes with varying levels of proof on an 
ad hoc basis, which undermines consistency and could promote the 
type of forum shopping among federal circuits that occurs in state 
courts.225  
                                                                                                                      
implied decimal that rendered some of the disparities incorrect and changed some of the 
variances.” Id.  
 219. Polypropylene Carpet, 996 F. Supp. at 24. 
 220. Id. at 23. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 24-25, 29, 30. 
 223. Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. CIV. A. 00-62222003 WL 302352, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003). In Nichols, the plaintiffs brought an antitrust suit against 
SmithKline Beecham Corporation under the Clayton Act. They alleged that SmithKline 
violated the federal antitrust laws by stockpiling and causing patents to be listed with the 
Food and Drug Administration in a way that allowed SmithKline to indefinitely extend its 
monopoly on Paxil. Id. at *1. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 
Id. at *9. 
 224. Id. at *4. 
 225. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is 
There Smoother Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709 (2000). 
1072  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1041 
 
3.   Daubert Analysis Limited but Noted 
 A number of courts are willing to perform a “limited” Daubert 
analysis.226 Courts tailor this narrow inquiry “to the purpose for 
which the expert opinion is offered.”227 Consequently, the court ad-
dresses whether it “may utilize [the expert’s testimony] in deciding 
whether the requisites of Rule 23 have been met.”228  
 The Second Circuit applies a limited Daubert analysis, but grants 
certification if the plaintiffs demonstrate at least a “colorable method 
of pro[of],” or if the “proposed methods are so insubstantial as to 
amount to no method at all.”229 The Second Circuit refused to weigh 
the opposing experts’ opinions even though they offered entirely con-
tradictory views on whether the plaintiffs met their burden of satis-
fying Rule 23.230 Although a limited Daubert analysis provides some 
protection, the leniency with which the court considered the evidence 
undermined the initial protection. If a court conducts only a limited 
Daubert analysis, it should seriously scrutinize and evaluate all the 
evidence so it can make a fully informed decision on whether the 
plaintiffs’ evidence more likely than not satisfies Rule 23. In addi-
tion, the court should not err on the side of certification when it per-
forms only a cursory review of the offered proof.231  
 Nevertheless, a district court in California favorably interpreted 
the Second Circuit’s limited analysis and, in Thomas & Thomas 
Rodmakers, Inc. v. Newport Adhesives & Composites, Inc., agreed 
that a “lower Daubert standard should be employed.”232 To support its 
proposition, the court declared that “an inquiry into the admissibility 
of the proposed expert testimony under Daubert would be an inap-
propriate consideration of the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.”233 The 
court further proffered that “an expert report should not be excluded 
merely on the basis that it assumes the substantive allegations of the 
complaint rather than relying upon actual data that may yet to be 
discovered.”234 This reasoning disregards the Supreme Court’s re-
                                                                                                                      
 226. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000), aff’d, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 536 U.S. 917 (2002); Midwestern Mach. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 
562, 565-66 (D. Minn. 2001) (stating that the application of Daubert is “somewhat limited 
at this stage”). 
 227. Visa Check/MasterMoney, 192 F.R.D. at 77. 
 228. Id. 
 229. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(citing In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 687 (D. Minn. 1995)). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Some courts err on the side of certification. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 
298 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 232. 209 F.R.D. 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 163. But see In re Hartford Sales Practices Litig., 192 F.R.D. 592, 602 (D. 
Minn. 1999) (“In determining whether class certification is appropriate under Rule 23, the 
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quirement of actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23,235 ig-
nores the court’s independent duty to inquire whether the plaintiffs 
met their burden,236 and takes no notice of the Supreme Court’s di-
rective to consider the merits to the degree necessary to determine 
compliance with Rule 23.237  
4.   Daubert Applied 
 Two district courts, one in the Fifth Circuit and one in the Third 
Circuit, actually applied a full Daubert analysis during class certifi-
cation.238 In Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., the district court indicated 
in a footnote that it concluded, prior to the hearing, that the proposed 
expert’s testimony “was proper under Daubert and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.”239 A Texas district court provided more details of its 
Daubert analysis in McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd.240 In a full 
written opinion, the court explained how it used Daubert to examine 
each of the defendants’ contentions in their motion to strike the 
plaintiffs’ expert opinion.241 Because of Daubert, the court held that it 
would not consider the plaintiffs’ expert’s methodology to determine 
the efficiency of a particular securities market since the method “had 
not been subjected to peer review, and was not shown to be generally 
                                                                                                                      
court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint.”); Lockwood Motors, Inc. v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 162 F.R.D. 569, 573 (D. Minn. 1995). 
 235. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). 
 236. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
 237. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12 (1978) (quoting 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911, at 485 n.45 
(1976)). 
 238. See McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-159, 2002 WL 32076175 (E.D. 
Tex. Sept. 30, 2002); Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., 191 F.R.D. 441 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
 239. 191 F.R.D. at 451 n.16; see also Kelly & Holley, supra note 1, at 6. For additional 
information on the Sanneman case, see supra note 119. 
 240. 2002 WL 32076175, at *1. This citation refers only to the court’s response to the 
defendants’ joint motion to strike the opinions and testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert. The 
plaintiffs’ alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are 
commonly known as “10b-5 claims.” To prove a 10b-5 claim, the plaintiffs must show “(1) a 
material misstatement or omission (2) which occurred in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities (3) that was made with scienter (4) harm, and (5) causation.” Id. (quoting 
Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2001)). Since the causa-
tion element required reliance, the plaintiffs used the fraud-on-the-market doctrine. Id. 
According to this doctrine, “where materially misleading statements have been dissemi-
nated into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual 
plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be presumed.” Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988)). Consequently, the plaintiffs offered an expert opinion 
on what constituted an efficient market for purposes of the plaintiffs’ fraud-on-the-market 
theory. The court admitted the expert’s opinion, with the exception of his “random walk 
analysis.” Id. at *6. 
 241. Id. 
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accepted by economists.”242 The court did, however, admit all other 
aspects of the expert’s opinion.243 
 Although this Section presented Daubert challenges as a progres-
sion of success, in reality, no uniformity or clear development exists 
in the courts. Daubert challenges, though frequently rejected, remain 
“hit or miss.” Until courts recognize the need to conduct a full 
Daubert analysis, litigants should argue that expert opinions are in-
admissible as a matter of law and lack a proper factual foundation.244 
The defense should also consider asking the court to appoint its own 
panel of experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.245 Experts ap-
pointed under Rule 706 may assist the court in deciding the ultimate 
causation issue.246  
 The courts’ varied approaches to Daubert largely reflect a mis-
guided reluctance to venture near the merits of the case and a lack of 
awareness of the resulting inconsistencies of requiring variable levels 
of proof. Some judges may simply be unsure about how to accurately 
apply the Federal Rules of Evidence during certification since the 
rules do not traditionally permit affidavits. Since courts accept affi-
davits during class certification and summary judgment and use both 
methods to discard frivolous civil cases, examining how the courts 
employ the Rules of Evidence during summary judgment provides 
one illustration of how Daubert could function as a means for exclud-
ing unreliable testimony during certification. 
V.   TOWARD A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO EXPERT EVIDENCE  
IN CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 The heavy reliance on expert testimony via affidavits and the ne-
cessity of avoiding a mini-trial during certification makes it impossi-
ble to implement the Federal Rules of Evidence in the same manner 
as they are used during trial. However, the summary judgment proc-
ess applies the rules in a way that ensures evidentiary safeguards 
and efficiency. Both summary judgment and class certification pro-
ceedings show a trend of using expert affidavits as evidence.247 Sum-
mary judgment, like class certification, presents a mechanism for 
dismissing meritless claims, limiting harassment of defendants, and 
                                                                                                                      
 242. Id. at *6. 
 243. Id. at *7. 
 244. See Vickers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 204 F.R.D. 476, 479 (D. Kan. 2001) (noting that 
during certification, the court should not admit expert testimony that is “so flawed that it 
is inadmissible as a matter of law”); Dawson, supra note 1, at 2051. 
 245. FED. R. EVID. 706.  
 246. See Patrick Lysaught, Forces Shaping Mass Tort Litigation: Strategies for Defense 
Counsel, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 165, 170 (2000). Judge Pointer, in the Alabama breast implant 
litigation cases, used a Rule 706 panel to address a Daubert challenge. Id. 
 247. Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Materials, 147 F.R.D. 647, pt. VI (1993); 
Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 285. 
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conserving judicial resources.248 In fact, at its outset, summary judg-
ment faced many of the same policy and institutional growing pains 
that now confront class certification.249 Consequently, even though 
class certification addresses more of a jurisdictional question and 
summary judgment a procedural one, summary judgment provides a 
starting point for discussion on how to implement evidentiary rules 
in certification. 
A.   The Rules of Evidence in Summary Judgment as a Framework 
for Class Certification 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which regulates summary 
judgment motions, allows the court to enter summary judgment 
when the pleadings, affidavits, and other papers on file demonstrate 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.250 Judges typically 
hold hearings for both class certification and summary judgment.251 
During summary judgment, litigants frequently depend on expert 
opinions to demonstrate issues of material fact;252 however, if those 
opinions are unreliable, then the issue of material fact may be noth-
ing more than smoke and mirrors. Consequently, at the summary 
judgment stage, expert affidavits must comply with the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.253 To help the court evaluate reliability, Rule 56(e) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits opposing counsel to 
submit alternative expert evidence to discredit or challenge the 
plaintiff’s affidavits.254 
 When parties challenge expert opinions, the court may grant 
summary judgment on two grounds: (1) when, under Daubert and 
Kumho Tire,255 evidence essential to the plaintiff’s case is inadmissi-
ble, or (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain a jury verdict.256 In 
this first situation, the judge must apply Rule 702 to determine 
                                                                                                                      
 248. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982); Douglas M. Towns, Note, Merit-
Based Class Action Certification: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 78 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1003 
(1992). 
 249. See Towns, supra note 248, at 1020.  
 250. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 251. Mullenix, supra note 16, at A14; William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment and 
Expert Evidence, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY; OPINION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FED-
ERAL AND STATE COURTS, 295, 298 (April 3-4, 2003). 
 252. See Brunet, supra note 247, at pt. VI. 
 253. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on per-
sonal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”). 
 254. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) permits affidavits “to be supplemented or 
opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.” Id. 
 255. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
 256. Schwarzer, supra note 251, at 297.  
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whether the expert is testifying to scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge to assist the judge in understanding the evidence 
or to determine a fact at issue.257 If the court decides that the “scin-
tilla of evidence . . . is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to con-
clude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains 
free to . . . grant summary judgment.”258 Similarly, during class certi-
fication, the judge should weigh all the evidence to decide whether 
the plaintiffs provided sufficient proof, as judged by a preponderance 
of the evidence standard, to satisfy Rule 23’s requirements. 
 Courts may grant summary judgment after excluding expert evi-
dence that supplied an essential element of the case.259 Admissibility 
of expert testimony under Daubert and sufficiency of the evidence in-
volve two distinct but associated inquiries. Admissibility concerns 
whether the court will allow a party to introduce the evidence during 
trial (expert evidence must pass Daubert prior to admission);260 suffi-
ciency asks the court to evaluate the expert’s conclusions and decide 
whether the combined evidence adequately introduces a jury ques-
tion.261 After a Daubert evaluation for reliability and relevancy,262 the 
judge may consider expert affidavits that either bolster or supply en-
tirely the sufficiency of the evidence.263  
 Likewise, parties in the class certification context should be able 
to submit expert affidavits to contest or support the requisites of 
Rule 23 only after the affidavits survive a Daubert analysis.264 The 
judge should then evaluate the expert’s conclusions and decide, after 
considering all of the evidence, whether the plaintiffs’ combined evi-
dence more likely than not satisfies each of the prerequisites in Rule 
23.  
 Just as the plaintiff must prove the Rule 23 requirements for class 
certification, the plaintiff, to prevent the court from granting sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, must come forward with sufficient 
evidence of an essential element of the claim.265 In summary judg-
ment, conflicts in expert evidence and inferences must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, which, in this sce-
nario, would be the plaintiff.266 In class certification, if the court de-
                                                                                                                      
 257. FED. R. EVID. 702. The issue in class certification is whether the plaintiff meets 
the requisites of Rule 23. 
 258. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. 
 259. Schwarzer, supra note 251, at 298. 
 260. Id. at 299. 
 261. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1132 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 262. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. 
 263. Schwarzer, supra note 251, at 299. 
 264. For an admonishment to district courts for considering only the plaintiffs’ expert 
testimony, see West v. Prudential Sec., Inc. 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 265. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 266. Joint E. & So. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d at 1124, 1137. 
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pends on Daubert safeguards and scrutinizes the evidence in accor-
dance with the preponderance of the evidence standard, it could then 
resolve ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff. In neither summary 
judgment nor class certification should the judge accept the plain-
tiff’s factual allegations as true;267 indeed, this level of deference to 
plaintiffs exists only in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.268  
 Unlike Rule 12(b)(6) motions,269 the court at the class certification 
stage must conduct a “rigorous analysis” in which it may need to ad-
dress questions that are “intimately” involved with the merits.270 By 
refusing to conduct any analysis of the opposing expert opinions, 
courts fail to adequately evaluate all of the evidence and seem to use 
Eisen’s merit inquiry prohibition as a supportive crutch.271 The rules 
of Civil Procedure endow district courts with substantial authority to 
conduct a comprehensive analysis.272 Appellate courts review Daubert 
decisions, even at the summary judgment stage, on an abuse of dis-
cretion standard,273 which gives the judiciary substantial latitude to 
rule on evidentiary matters and to produce a well-informed certifica-
tion decision. 
 Regardless of the virtues of this approach, some may argue that 
summary judgment’s evidentiary procedures should not apply during 
class certification because the plaintiff has not completed discovery. 
Although the summary judgment process allows plaintiffs to finish 
discovery and present the totality of their evidence, the plaintiff pre-
paring for class certification has also already engaged in extensive 
discovery.274 Courts should limit discovery to the issues necessary to 
                                                                                                                      
 267. See generally West, 282 F.3d at 938. But see In re Hartford Sales Practices Litig., 
192 F.R.D. 592, 602 (D. Minn. 1999) (“In determining whether class certification is appro-
priate under Rule 23, the court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint.”). 
 268. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 269. See In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 106 (D.C. Cir. 
2002); McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-159, 2002 WL 32076175, at *3 (E.D. 
Tex. Sept. 30, 2002) (noting that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “differs significantly” from a class 
certification hearing). 
 270. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982) (stating that courts 
must conduct a rigorous analysis to determine whether the plaintiff met all of the Rule 
23(a) requirements for certification); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12 
(1978) (noting that some of the questions that involved determining the appropriateness of 
class certification are “intimately” involved with the merits of the case). In the Eleventh 
Circuit, the court has a duty to independently evaluate whether the plaintiffs met their 
burden on each Rule 23 requirement, even if uncontested by the defendant. Valley Drug 
Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 271. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (prohibiting a prelimi-
nary inquiry into the merits of a case during class certification). 
 272. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d). 
 273. Even though summary judgment is typically reviewed de novo, rulings on admis-
sibility under Daubert are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 
136, 147 (1997). 
 274. Crump, supra note 17, at 7; Savett, supra note 81, at 33 (“Defendants will raise a 
myriad of objections to avoid and stall the production of documents. Nevertheless, courts 
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a certification determination;275 however, plaintiffs often seek broad 
discovery on the merits to develop fundamental aspects of their case 
prior to certification.276 As noted by the Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion, “[b]ifurcating class and merits discovery . . . can result in dupli-
cation and unnecessary disputes among counsel over the scope of dis-
covery.”277 The 2003 advisory committee notes to revised Rule 23 ob-
served, “[a]lthough an evaluation of the probable outcome on the 
merits is not properly part of the certification decision, discovery in 
aid of the certification decision often includes information required to 
identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented at 
trial.”278  The notes advise that “[i]n this sense it is appropriate to 
conduct controlled discovery into the ‘merits,’ limited to those aspects 
relevant to making the certification decision on an informed basis.”279  
Consequently, the committee encourages “active judicial supervision” 
to “achieve the most effective balance that expedites an informed cer-
tification determination without forcing an artificial and ultimately 
wasteful division between ‘certification discovery’ and ‘merits discov-
ery.’”280 In the past, district courts have enjoyed considerable discre-
tion in determining the scope of discovery in class certification;281 
however, failure to permit discovery on class certification issues may 
                                                                                                                      
generally permit plaintiff[s] to pursue extensive discovery provided the documents being 
sought are relevant.”). But see Midwestern Mach. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562, 
566 (D. Minn. 2001) (stating “[i]t would be inappropriate, however, for a court to look be-
yond the methodology and critique the prospective results of its application to a complete 
set of data. A party and its experts should not be expected to have fully evaluated all data 
at the preliminary stage of class certification.” (citations omitted)). For more information 
on discovery issues in class certification, see James F. Jorden, Discovery and Evidentiary 
Issues in Non-Federal Question Class Actions, in NON-FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS 2002:  
PROSECUTION & DEFENSE STRATEGIES 439 (PLI Litig. Course & Admin. Practice Handbook 
Series No. H-679, 2002), available at WL 679 PLI/Lit 439. 
 275. Stephen H. Kupperman, Discovery and Evidentiary Issues in Non-Federal Ques-
tion Class Actions, in NON-FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS:  PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
STRATEGIES 373, 377 (PLI Litig. Course & Admin. Practice Handbook Series No. H-660, 
2001), available at WL 660 PLI/Lit 373. 
 276. Id. at 377. However, experts retained in anticipation of litigation that will not be 
testifying in a future trial may not be compelled to provide information during discovery to 
the opposing side. See Ludwig v. Pilkington N. Am., Inc., No. 03 C 1086, 2003 WL 
22242224, slip op. at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2003) (holding that environmental consultants 
hired by a glass manufacturer, but who didn’t expect to testify at trial cannot be compelled 
to provide information to residents suing for arsenic contamination), class cert. granted, 
2003 WL 22478842, slip op. at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003). 
 277. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.12 (1995). 
 278. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note.  
 279. Id.  
 280. Id.  
 281. Villar v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 990 F.2d 1489, 1495 (5th Cir. 1993); Stewart v. 
Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1982); see, e.g., Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Corp., 509 F.2d 
205, 209 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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constitute an abuse of discretion, particularly in light of the 2003 re-
visions to Rule 23.282 
 In ruling on summary judgment motions, courts have effectively 
employed Daubert and the Rules of Evidence to help them navigate 
the gray area of highly specialized issues, and to separate cases with 
issues of material fact from meritless claims.283 By subjecting evi-
dence presented at the certification stage to similar evidentiary pro-
cedures, the court may lighten its judicial burden by making more in-
formed decisions, provide consistency within the federal courts, and 
consequently restore the legitimacy of the class action.  
B.   The Case for Evidentiary Rules in Class Certification 
 Before three vital Supreme Court cases, the summary judgment 
process contained almost as many gray areas and uncertainties as 
does class certification. The summary judgment trilogy, Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,284 Celotex Corp. v. Ca-
trett,285 and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,286 expanded and clarified 
the use of summary judgment. These cases continue to supply trial 
courts with the necessary means to promote efficiency and fairness 
while avoiding unjustifiable expense and delay in accordance with 
Rule 102.287 Before these cases, courts took a more restrictive ap-
proach toward summary judgment.288 This restrictive approach is 
mirrored in the class certification context, except that certification 
remains on the cusp of transition. 
 Most courts faced with evidentiary concerns during certification 
evade Daubert challenges by claiming that this asks them to travel 
into the prohibited area of “merit inquiry.”289 Courts have not uni-
                                                                                                                      
 282. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1086 (6th Cir. 1996); Chateau de 
Ville Prod., Inc. v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 586 F.2d 962, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Yaffee v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972), questioned by Dionne v. Springfield 
Sch. Comm., 340 F. Supp. 334, 335 (D. Mass 1972). In Valley Drug Co. v Geneva Pharma-
ceuticals., Inc., the court held that denying a request for “downstream recovery,” discovery 
relating to the wholesalers’ sales practices, constituted an abuse of discretion because the 
record to decide the issue of whether the class met the prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3) was in-
complete. 350 F.3d 1181, 1195 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 283. Daubert challenges have become increasingly fatal to cases with unreliable evi-
dence. See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., CHANGES IN THE 
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE 
DAUBERT DECISION xvi (2001). 
 284. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 285. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 286. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 287. FED. R. EVID. 102; see also Towns, supra note 248, at 1028. 
 288. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (heavily distinguished) 
(adopting Judge Frank’s approach in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 475 (2d Cir. 1946)). 
 289. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers, Inc. v. Newport Adhesives & Composites, Inc., 
209 F.R.D. 159, 162-63 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“It is clear to the Court that a lower Daubert 
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formly applied the restriction against an inquiry into the merits,290 
which has produced a hodgepodge of discretionary decisions that lack 
a principled justification.291 When conducting a rigorous analysis in 
complex cases,292 district courts must often examine more than just 
the pleadings to understand the claims, defenses, facts, and applica-
ble substantive law before “mak[ing] a meaningful determination of 
the certification issues.”293 This examination does not stop when the 
court encounters an expert opinion.  
 Judge Easterbrook, of the Seventh Circuit, recognized this need to 
evaluate expert testimony during certification in an opinion revers-
ing and reprimanding a district court judge.294 He began by noting 
that the judge “thought [a] clash [between economists] enough by it-
self to support class certification and a trial on the merits.”295 How-
ever, according to Easterbrook, that limited support “amount[ed] to a 
delegation of judicial power to the plaintiffs, who [could] obtain class 
certification just by hiring a competent expert.”296 Accordingly, he 
emphasized that a district court judge “may not duck hard questions 
by observing that each side has some support,”297 and concluded that 
“[t]ough questions must be faced and squarely decided, if necessary 
by holding evidentiary hearings and choosing between competing 
perspectives.”298  Although Judge Easterbrook did not specifically 
mention Daubert, his point is clear: district courts have a duty to in-
quire into the relevancy and reliability of expert testimony during 
certification regardless of whether that inquiry leads them into a 
battle of the experts or the case’s merits.299 
                                                                                                                      
standard should be employed at this stage of the proceedings. Courts have declined to en-
gage in a Daubert analysis at the class certification stage of an action on the ground that 
an inquiry into the admissibility of the proposed expert testimony under Daubert would be 
an inappropriate consideration of the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.”); O’Connor v. Boeing 
N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 321 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that the defendant’s request 
for a Daubert analysis is inappropriate because it is directed at the merits of the plaintiffs’ 
claims). 
 290. An inquiry into the merits is prohibited by Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 
156, 178 (1974). 
 291. Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1254; Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 289. 
 292. Courts must conduct a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23(a) requirements. Gen. Tel. 
Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). 
 293. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 294. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 295. Id. at 938. This is precisely what the Second Circuit does. See In re Visa 
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 296. West, 282 F.3d at 938. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
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 The Supreme Court intended Daubert to apply to all proceedings 
with expert testimony.300 Daubert protects “the trier of fact,” which 
indicates that the safeguard applies equally to the judge or the jury, 
from flawed evidence and ensures that the decision-maker considers 
only relevant and reliable expert testimony.301 One court dodged 
Daubert by concluding that it was not a trier of fact at the certifica-
tion hearing since it could not engage in a merit inquiry.302 The 
Daubert analysis, however, is not an inquiry into the merits; it func-
tions to shield the judicial process from flawed testimony, not to seek 
the truth of the claims.303 In response to one set of plaintiffs’ allega-
tions that striking their expert affidavit would go to the merits of the 
case, the court in In re Ford Motor Company Ignition Switch Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation, stated that it did not examine the plaintiffs’ 
expert reports “with the intent of determining the likelihood of any of 
the parties prevailing at trial,” but instead “read those documents in 
order to determine the contours of the issues that would be involved 
in such a trial.”304  
 Although most courts refuse to conduct a full Daubert analysis 
during certification, courts allow litigants to make a Daubert chal-
lenge against the same experts and the same evidence during trial.305 
If the expert’s opinion or method does not withstand Daubert at trial, 
and the court suddenly realizes that it cannot manage all the claims 
under differing state laws or that common claims do not predomi-
nate, it must then decertify the class.306 The court could have pre-
vented the additional time and expense of a trial had it conducted a 
Daubert inquiry during certification. This roundabout process con-
                                                                                                                      
 300. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993) 
(using the broad terminology “trier of fact” rather than “jury”). 
 301. See id. at 591-92. 
 302. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney, 192 F.R.D. 68, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“I am very 
far from the ‘trier of fact’ contemplated in Rule 702. Indeed, I am expressly forbidden from 
engaging in ‘a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the case.’”), aff’d, 280 F.3d 124 (2d 
Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 536 U.S. 917 
(2002). 
 303. Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 293. 
 304. In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 345 
(D.N.J. 1997), vacated in not relevant part, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22891 (D.N.J. July 27, 
1999). In Ford, plaintiffs wanted to certify a class action on behalf of purchasers or lessees 
of vehicles that allegedly caught fire because of a defective ignition switch. Id. at 337. A 
second class of purchasers and lessees whose vehicles did not catch fire also wanted to cer-
tify their action as a class action. Id. at 338. The district court, however, denied certifica-
tion to both groups because they failed to demonstrate the predominance and superiority 
requirements for Rule 23(b)(3) certification. Id. at 356. The court also refused the plaintiffs’ 
request to provide them with conditional certification. Id. 
 305. See Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 471 (S.D. Ohio 2001). 
 306. The Third Circuit has certified classes with the caveat that, if the case becomes 
unmanageable, it may decertify or redefine the class. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up 
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 815 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Sch. Asbestos 
Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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tradicts the rationale for using class actions in the first place: to 
promote judicial economy and efficiently resolve multiple claims.307  
 Some courts liberally construe the class certification requirements 
and hold that “if there are doubts at the certification stage those un-
certainties should be resolved in favor of certifying the class.”308 This 
position reflects the flexibility in Rule 23(c), which allows the court to 
issue conditional certification orders and then alter or amend them 
before deciding the merits.309 However, as the Supreme Court indi-
cated, “actual, not presumed conformance with Rule 23(a) remains 
. . . indispensable.”310 Consequently, courts should not use this flexi-
bility as a means to certify a class that fails to satisfy the prerequi-
sites of Rule 23.  
 When contemplating a certification decision in favor of certifying 
the class, courts should consider both Rule 102 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, which requires judges to construe the rules to eliminate 
unjustifiable expense and delay,311 and Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which directs judges to construe and administer the 
rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.”312 Even the Supreme Court observed that the principal 
purpose of the class action procedure is “the efficiency and economy 
of litigation.”313 If the class is certified without “significant proof” of 
the Rule 23(a) requirements,314 then decertified at trial, the court’s 
initial certification decision undermines the principal purpose of the 
class action mechanism.315  
                                                                                                                      
 307. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). 
 308. In re Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D 79, 93 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(citing Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also Kidwell v. Transp. 
Communications Int’l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 305 (4th Cir. 1991); Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, 
Inc., 173 F.R.D. 156, 159 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) (“The recent trend in class certification deci-
sions is to interpret Rule 23 flexibly and give it a liberal construction.”). Although a class 
may be conditionally certified under Rule 23(c)(1), the Rules say nothing about resolving 
uncertainties in favor of the class. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. In Microcrystalline, the plaintiffs, 
who purchased microcrystalline cellulose, which is an “inert binding agent in pharmaceuti-
cal and vitamin tablets,” filed suit against the sellers. Microcrystalline, 218 F.R.D. at 81. In 
the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, they alleged antitrust violations. Id. The dis-
trict court granted the motion for class certification, stating, “[t]he Court of Appeals has 
held that if there are doubts at the certification stage those uncertainties should be re-
solved in favor of certifying the class.” Id. at 93.  
 309. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
 310. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160. 
 311. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 312. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 313. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 
553 (1974)). 
 314. Id. at 159 n.15. 
 315. Id. at 159 (stating that the efficiency and economy of litigation is the principal 
purpose of the class action). 
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 Without Daubert safeguards, resolving doubts in favor of certifica-
tion ignores the consequences of certification for the defendant,316 
wastes judicial resources, increases the expense of the action, and 
causes delays while the defendant appeals a possibly uninformed and 
unjust certification.317 Federal courts of appeal recently granted 
thirty-two of forty-one certification appeals, and decertified the vast 
majority of those classes.318 The appellate courts upheld the district 
courts’ class certification in only five instances.319 Although these fig-
ures indicate that the appeals process in Rule 23(f) appears to be 
working properly, the reversal of this many cases indicates that the 
appellate courts may not approve of the district courts’ permissive 
approach to certification.320  
 Like summary judgment, class certification provides a method for 
conserving judicial resources by avoiding multiple suits.321 Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) reserves the class action mechanism 
for situations in which joinder is unavailable, which reinforces the 
emphasis on fostering judicial economy.322 When courts decline to use 
a Daubert inquiry during certification and later discover that the ex-
pert’s unreliable opinion led them to erroneously certify the class, the 
class action wastes judicial resources and is not the most efficient 
means of adjudication. If the district courts conducted a Daubert in-
quiry prior to admitting evidence or if they at least considered and 
evaluated all of the evidence against a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, they could avoid squandering judicial resources on a class 
that does not sufficiently prove the requirements of Rule 23(a).323 
                                                                                                                      
 316. See infra Part VI.A. 
 317. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937-38 (7th Cir. 2002) (handling 
an appeal from class certification and noting the need for resolving the appeal promptly). 
Federal circuit courts have granted thirty-two of forty-one Rule 23(f) petitions (appeals 
from orders granting or denying class action certification). Fardy, supra note 139, at 9. The 
“vast majority” of these decisions decertified the class. Id. 
 318. Fardy, supra note 139, at 9.  
 319. Id.  
 320. The Second Circuit does not seem to mind the permissive approach to certification 
and encourages its courts to err on the side of certifying the class. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 
406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[I]f there is to be an error made, let it be in favor and not 
against the maintenance of the class action, for it is always subject to modification should 
later developments during the course of the trial so require.”).  
 321. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); see Crown, Cork & Seal 
Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 351 (1983). 
 322. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Other factors besides simple numbers play into deter-
mining the feasibility of joinder. These include “(1) the nature and complexity of the action, 
(2) the size of individual claims, and (3) the geographic distribution of the members of the 
class.” JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.2 (3d ed. 1999) (footnotes omit-
ted). 
 323. Daubert challenges have become increasingly fatal to cases. See DIXON & GILL, 
supra note 283, at xvi. 
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VI.   THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CLASS ACTIONS 
 At their core, class actions serve three vital purposes: (1) preserv-
ing judicial resources and increasing judicial economy;324 (2) protect-
ing the rights of consumers who would not pursue individual claims 
due to expense, reticence, or ignorance;325 and (3) guarding against 
the possibility of inconsistent results.326 Although the class action 
mechanism retains the potential for fairly and efficiently adjudicat-
ing multiple claims,327 it can also “put considerable pressure on the 
defendant to settle, even when the plaintiffs’ probability of success on 
the merits is slight.”328 Congress has proposed a number of bills, 
many titled “Class Action Fairness Acts,” to move class actions from 
state to federal courts where Congress believes there will be greater 
consistency.329 Yet, with their already overburdened dockets, the fed-
eral courts cannot afford to waste judicial resources on trials arising 
from erroneously certified classes, much less on classes removed from 
state courts.330 Employing Daubert during certification can both miti-
gate the “blackmail” charge by dismissing frivolous class actions and 
act as a tool for conserving judicial resources in the event that Con-
gress passes a class action fairness act.331  
A.   Blackmail Settlements 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide safeguards to ensure fair 
proceedings,332 yet as seen previously, federal courts refuse to employ 
them during certification.333 The resulting prejudice to defendants 
led, in part, to prominent judges reversing certification decisions that 
                                                                                                                      
 324. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 553; See Parker, 462 U.S. at 351. 
 325. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985); Kramer v. Scientific 
Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1091 (3d Cir. 1976); Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 92 F.R.D. 
32, 49-50 (E.D. Va. 1981); Shields v. First Nat’l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442, 445 (D. Ariz. 1972). 
 326. First Fed. v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 327. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class 
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2000). 
 328. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 329. For a discussion of moving class actions into federal courts, see John H. Beisner & 
Jessica D. Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of It . . . in State Court, 25 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 143 (2001); see also Mullenix, supra note 225. 
 330. See CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2002 YEAR-END REP. ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY pt. II, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2002year-endreport.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). 
 331. On October 22, 2003 the Senate rejected, by one vote, the cloture motion for the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2003. Ralph Lindeman, Class Action Bill: Senate Motion to 
Consider Class Action Bill Fails by One Vote; Dodd, Landrieu Key Votes, 4 Class Action 
Litig. Rep. (BNA) 768 (Oct. 24, 2003). Senator Mary Landrieu cast the key vote defeating 
the bill and explained that even though she “remained firmly committed to class action re-
form,” she did not receive certain crucial changes. Id. 
 332. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 333. See supra Part IV.B. 
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fostered what they considered blackmail.334 Once plaintiffs certify 
their class, they may coerce or “blackmail” defendants into settle-
ment.335 Lax certification standards risk high litigation and settle-
ment costs by inviting frivolous, weak class action suits.336 Plaintiffs 
may capitalize on these lenient standards to gain an undue advan-
tage in negotiating settlements.337 As a result, the plaintiffs’ recovery 
may not reflect the merits of their claims so much as it does the de-
fendants’ fear of staking their financial viability on the outcome of a 
single jury trial.338 Rather than face the possibility of devastating 
damage awards and potential bankruptcy,339 risk averse defendants 
often prefer to settle.340  
 Notably, Judge Posner, in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,341 and 
Judge Easterbrook, in both West v. Prudential Securities, Inc.342 and 
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,343 commented disapprovingly on 
how the class action device has turned into a medium for black-
mail.344 Judge Posner indicated alarm over the demonstrably weak 
proof of the plaintiffs’ claims as compared to the tremendous litiga-
tion and liability risks for the defendant.345 Judge Easterbrook voiced 
a similar concern that settlements “reflect [a] high risk of catastro-
phic loss” and force “defendants to pay substantial sums even when 
the plaintiffs have weak positions.”346 Consequently, “[t]he effect of a 
class certification in inducing settlement to curtail the risk of large 
                                                                                                                      
 334. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016, 
1021 (7th Cir. 2002), rev’g in part 205 F.R.D. 503, cert. denied sub nom. Gustafson v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 
935, 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299, 1304 
(7th Cir. 1995). 
 335. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1016; West, 282 F.3d at 937; Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1299. 
 336. Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1254. 
 337. Towns, supra note 248, at 1029. 
 338. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 327, at 1390.  
 339. More than a dozen corporations involved in asbestos litigation sought protection 
in the bankruptcy courts, as did companies involved in the Dalkon Shield and silicone 
breast implant litigation. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Re-
alities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 
188 (2001). 
 340. Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1254; Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 327, at 1390. 
 341. 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 342. 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 343. 288 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 344. But see In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145, 147 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (certifying a class despite its potential coercive effect). 
 345. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1299. 
 346. West, 282 F.3d at 937 (citing Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A 
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); Reinier Kra-
akman, Hyun Park et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. 
L.J. 1733 (1994); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 
7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 61 (1991)). 
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awards provides a powerful reason to take an interlocutory ap-
peal.”347 
 Judge Easterbrook reiterated this position in In re Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc. by remarking that the consequences of aggre-
gating millions of claims “makes the case so unwieldy, and the stakes 
so large, that settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at a price 
that reflects the risk of a catastrophic judgment as much as, if not 
more than, the actual merit of the claims.”348 Although some scholars 
have debated the reality of this position,349 using Daubert before ad-
mitting expert evidence combined with weighing the evidence to 
judge whether it satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 by a prepon-
derance of the evidence will allow courts to parse through weak 
claims and strengthen the fairness and efficiency of the class action 
mechanism. Requiring reliable expert opinions early in the process 
could lessen the opportunity for blackmail on weak claims and re-
store the positive functions of the class action mechanism.350  
B.   The Class Action Fairness Acts 
 One of the most important functions of the class action is the 
preservation of scarce judicial resources.351 As Chief Justice 
Rehnquist observed in his 2002 Year-End Report on the Federal Ju-
diciary, the federal courts are operating with insufficient resources 
and cannot bear any additional burden.352 He explains: 
Despite a substantial increase in workload, the number of judge-
ships in the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, and Ninth 
Circuits has not increased for 18 years—since 1984. During that 
time period, appellate filings in the First Circuit have risen 56%, 
in the Second Circuit they have risen almost 70%, and in the 
Ninth Circuit appellate filings have more than doubled—rising 
almost 115%.353 
Congress may soon exponentially amplify the burden on the already 
overtaxed judiciary if it passes a class action fairness act.354 Although 
                                                                                                                      
 347. Id. 
 348. 288 F.3d at 1016. 
 349. See, e.g., Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Black-
mail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (suggesting that the cases make questionable or un-
proven factual allegations regarding wrongful coercion of defendants). 
 350. The three noble purposes of the class action mechanism are listed at the begin-
ning of Part VI, supra. 
 351. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974) (stating that the effi-
ciency and economy of litigation is the principal purpose of the class action). 
 352. See REHNQUIST, supra note 330, at pt. II. 
 353. Id.  
 354. For information on past bills, see Glenn A. Danas, The Interstate Class Action Ju-
risdiction Act of 1999: Another Congressional Attempt to Federalize State Law, 49 EMORY 
L.J. 1305 (2000). 
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the federal judiciary stringently opposes the act since it already lacks 
sufficient operational resources,355 Congress continues to introduce 
different forms of the bill each year.356 Each version of the act differs, 
but the core provision in each implements a concept of “minimal di-
versity.”357 Minimal diversity expands federal court jurisdiction over 
large interstate class actions by requiring that only one plaintiff and 
one defendant reside in different states.358 In the most recent version 
of the act, if minimal diversity exists, any defendant or any plaintiff 
may remove the action from state to federal courts without the con-
sent of all the defendants or all the plaintiffs.359 
 The Senate recently rejected, by one vote, a cloture motion to 
bring the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 to its floor.360 This close 
defeat encouraged supporters to quickly create a similar bill that 
might attract one additional vote.361 If Congress actually passes a 
version of the class action fairness act, the federal judiciary will have 
to find a means to reduce the strain on its court system.362 Just as the 
courts developed and expanded the use of summary judgment to dis-
pense with meritless claims and conserve judicial resources, the 
courts could fairly dispense with frivolous class actions by subjecting 
experts to a Daubert analysis during certification and weighing the 
evidence offered to prove the requirements of Rule 23 in accordance 
with the preponderance of the evidence standard.  
 A recent study of Daubert’s impact in the courts indicates that 
challenges to expert evidence have become increasingly fatal to 
cases.363 The study noted that once judges fulfilled their role as 
                                                                                                                      
 355. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1115 Before the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 123 (2003) (statement of Rep. John Conyers). 
 356. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003); Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act of 2002, H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2002); Class Action Fairness Act of 
2001, S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001); Class Action Fairness Act of 2000, S. 353, 106th Cong. 
(2000); Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 357. See S. 274, § 4. 
 358. See id. 
 359. Id. § 5(a). 
 360. Lindeman, supra note 331, at 768. Senate supporters of the bill think that a bill 
could still be passed this session. Ralph Lindeman, Class Action Bill: Provisions in Senate 
Class Action Bill Said in Conflict with Federal Notice Rules, 4 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 
(BNA) 815 (Nov. 14, 2003). For more information on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, 
see Representative John Conyers, Jr., Class Action “Fairness”—A Bad Deal for the States 
and Consumers, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493 (2003); Martha Neil, New Route for Class Ac-
tions: Proposals Raise Questions About Whether Giving Federal Courts More Power Over 
Cases Will Cure the System’s Ills, 89 A.B.A. J. 48 (2003). 
 361. Lindeman, supra note 331, at 768. 
 362. The RAND Institute for Civil Justice recommends increasing judicial resources. 
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: 
PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 36 (1999).  The Institute notes, “[s]aving 
money on damage class actions by limiting judicial scrutiny is a foolish economy that has 
the long-term consequence of wasting society’s resources.” Id. 
 363. DIXON & GILL, supra note 283, at xvi.  
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“watchful gatekeepers,” they examined all aspects of the evidence 
more closely and rigorously assessed its reliability.364 Consequently, 
if the federal courts employ Daubert at the class certification stage, 
they could effectively eliminate both unreliable evidence and unsub-
stantiated class actions while lightening their overburdened docket. 
VII.   INHERENT FLEXIBILITY: JUDGES’ BROAD AUTHORITY  
TO PREVENT REPETITION 
 The district courts already possess the authority to conduct a 
Daubert inquiry and weigh the evidence offered to prove the requi-
sites of Rule 23 during class certification. Appellate courts review 
certification decisions on an abuse of discretion standard,365 and Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d) allows the court to determine the 
course of the proceedings.366 When viewed in light of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1, which directs courts to administer the rules to “se-
cure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion,”367 the district courts have a greater responsibility to use their 
authority to eliminate inconsistent views of “sufficiency” and to make 
more informed certification decisions. 
A.   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d) 
 The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognized 
the need for flexibility and fashioned Rule 23 to endow district courts 
with significant discretion.368 According to Rule 23(d), the court has 
authority to “prevent undue repetition or complication in the presen-
tation of evidence or argument,” and to ensure “fair conduct of the ac-
tion.”369 Rule 23(d)(3), in particular, specifically allows courts to im-
pose additional conditions on the class representative as the circum-
stances warrant.370 The court can also fashion appropriate orders to 
deal with “procedural matters.”371 The Federal Rules of Evidence are 
considered procedural in nature.372 Accordingly, these explicit grants 
                                                                                                                      
 364. Id. at xv. 
 365. E.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Anti-
trust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2001); Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 
F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 
291 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 366. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d). 
 367. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 368. Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 
F.R.D. 39, 39 (1967). 
 369. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d). 
 370. Id. at 23(d)(3). 
 371. Id. at 23(d)(5). 
 372. Feldman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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of power allow the court not only to employ the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, but also to control all aspects of class certification. 
 In short, drafters of Rule 23 aimed to conserve judicial resources 
and to provide a procedural vehicle for aggregating multiple claims. 
The class certification requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b) are 
framed in general terms to empower the courts with the flexibility to 
apply the requirements to an expansive array of claims.373 Rule 23(d) 
gives judges broad discretion to assure fair and just adjudication.374 
Using evidentiary rules and a uniform burden of proof to evaluate 
sufficiency during certification promotes fair and just adjudication by 
acting as a barrier to the admission of unreliable expert testimony as 
well as to certifying classes with insufficient proof.  
B.   Abuse of Discretion Standard 
 In addition to the authority granted by Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23(d), appellate courts review district court decisions on class 
certification using an abuse of discretion standard.375 Rule 23(f) al-
lows courts of appeal to grant interlocutory orders to review the dis-
trict court’s grant or denial of class action certification.376 Appellate 
courts have broad discretion over whether to accept a Rule 23(f) peti-
tion.377  
 Since no “hard-and-fast test” exists for determining whether to 
grant a Rule 23(f) petition, intermediate appellate courts consider 
several factors.378 These factors may include whether the case raises 
a novel or unsettled question,379 the likelihood of success on the mer-
its,380 the posture of the case,381 and the “death-knell” factor, which 
                                                                                                                      
 373. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b). 
 374. See id. at 23(d). 
 375. See In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, sub nom., 
N.W. Airlines Corp. v. Chase, 123 S. Ct. 2252 (2003). The Second Circuit is “noticeably less 
deferential to the district court when that court has denied class status than when it has 
certified a class.” Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Lundquist v. Sec. Pac. Auto. Fin. Servs. Corp., 993 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1993)). In 
Caridad, present and former African-American employees brought a Title VII race dis-
crimination action against Metro-North Commuter Railroad. Id. at 283. The district court 
denied class certification. Id. The Second Circuit reversed the denial of class certification 
because the district court credited Metro-North’s expert evidence over that of the plaintiffs’ 
expert. Id. at 293. Accordingly, the court held that “[s]uch a weighing of the evidence is not 
appropriate at this stage in the litigation.” Id. 
 376. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 377. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an ap-
peal from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under 
this rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order.”). 
 378. Delta, 310 F.3d at 959. 
 379. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note; In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate 
Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (considering review “when the certifi-
cation decision presents an unsettled and fundamental issue of law relating to class ac-
tions”). 
 380. Delta, 310 F.3d at 960. 
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recognizes that the costs of continuing litigation for either party may 
present a difficulty.382 Consequently, Rule 23(f) appeals should be the 
exception, not the norm.383 However, by granting thirty-two of forty-
one class certification appeals and decertifying all but five, the appel-
late courts seem to strongly indicate that the district courts should 
substantially inquire into whether the plaintiff actually provided suf-
ficient evidence of the Rule 23 requirements.384  
 All of these factors and considerations can lead to one result: the 
district court should use its authority to conduct a full Daubert 
analysis prior to admitting expert evidence. District court judges 
should also use their authority to weigh the evidence when conduct-
ing a rigorous analysis to determine whether the plaintiff met, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the prerequisites of Rule 23. Then the 
court could fairly resolve ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff and err 
on the side of certification.  
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 As the reliance on experts becomes routine during class certifica-
tion, district courts need to respond to preserve both the proper pur-
poses of the class action and the overarching need for just and fair 
resolution of the case. Ideally, to make a fair and informed decision 
on certification, judges should routinely apply Daubert as a precursor 
to admitting expert evidence, adequately evaluate opposing expert 
opinions, and use a preponderance of the evidence standard to judge 
the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence before resolving ambiguities 
in favor of the plaintiffs and erring on the side of certification.385 
Courts have a duty to exclude unreliable and irrelevant testimony 
from consideration. Using Daubert during certification is an effective 
means of reducing the number of frivolous class actions, increasing 
judicial economy, preventing blackmail, bolstering the legitimacy of 
class actions, and restoring the noble and practical purposes of the 
class action device.  
                                                                                                                      
 381. If it looks as though the district court will reexamine its decision to certify the 
class, appellate courts are less likely to grant interlocutory appeals. Id. 
 382. See Lorazepam, 289 F.3d at 99; Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 
834 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 383. Delta, 310 F.3d at 959-60; Lorazepam, 289 F.3d at 105. 
 384. See Fardy, supra note 139, at 9.  
 385. The burden of proof during class certification has not been previously addressed in 
court cases. However, since the typical burden of proof in civil cases is a preponderance of 
the evidence, courts should require plaintiffs to prove that they have more likely than not 
met the requirements of Rule 23. See supra Part II.B. 
